The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review by Steinzor, Rena
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
Volume 1 | Issue 1
2012
The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House
Regulatory Review
Rena Steinzor
University of Maryland School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review , 1 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 209 (2012).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol1/iss1/6
  
 
209 
THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING 
CENTRALIZED WHITE HOUSE 
REGULATORY REVIEW  
Rena Steinzor* 
A series of catastrophic regulatory failures have focused attention on the 
weakened condition of regulatory agencies assigned to protect public health, work-
er and consumer safety, and the environment. The destructive convergence of 
funding shortfalls, political attacks, and outmoded legal authority have set the 
stage for ineffective enforcement, unsupervised industry self-regulation, and a 
slew of devastating and preventable catastrophes. From the Deepwater Horizon 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico to the worst mining disaster in forty years at the Big 
Branch mine in West Virginia, the signs of regulatory dysfunction abound. Many 
stakeholders expected that President Barack Obama would recognize and amelio-
rate this unacceptable state of affairs, but his administration has largely ignored 
it, instead accepting Republican claims that over-regulation is the overriding 
problem du jour. 
One central reason for the systemic failure of effective health and safety 
regulation is the fact that many regulatory matters enter and exit the White 
House through the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) little-known but 
extraordinarily powerful Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 
Centralized White House regulatory review began in the Nixon administration 
and OIRA was created in 1980. Over four decades, the process has evolved into 
a relentless gauntlet for public health, worker safety, and environmental protec-
tion initiatives, subjecting the agencies’ efforts to implement their demanding 
statutory mandates to withering rule-by-rule review. Analogous to examining the 
roots of individual trees without realizing that they are part of a dying forest, this 
myopia has obscured the causes and effects of regulatory failure for five presidents 
from both parties. 
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210 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
This Article proposes that the President terminate centralized White House 
regulatory review of individual rules and abolish OIRA’s role in regulatory af-
fairs. The President can exert sufficient control over rulemaking through the 
political appointees he has selected to lead the agencies, and they can work on 
cross-cutting issues affecting more than one agency within the framework of the 
Domestic Policy Council. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Catastrophic regulatory failures dominate the headlines with a frequen-
cy that is unprecedented. Tragedies as diverse as the Deepwater Horizon spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico, the Big Branch mine disaster, one billion gallons of 
overflowing coal ash sludge in Tennessee, the deadly Texas City and Tesoro 
refinery explosions, tainted food and drugs, and increasingly dangerous 
consumer product imports can all be traced to corporate scofflaws repeated-
ly allowed to run amok by beleaguered regulatory agencies suffering from 
acute dysfunction.1 
Although everyone should be able to agree that these events are intol-
erable, thoughtful analysis is sidetracked by the nation’s polarized debate 
over the role of government. Conservative commentators argue that acci-
dents like the Gulf spill are the inevitable byproducts of industrialization, 
having little to do with government failure.2 They say that overregulation is 
a far more serious problem than underregulation because excessive rules 
hobble the country’s long-delayed recovery from a devastating worldwide 
recession.3 Progressive commentators respond that these events reflect the 
demise of a regulatory state that was weakened to the point of dysfunction 
during the presidency of George W. Bush and never given an opportunity 
to recover.4 One of the government’s most important jobs is to compel 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et al., Consumer Protection in an Era of Globalization, in 
IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 3–21 (Cary 
Coglianese et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter IMPORT SAFETY] (describing the American recall 
of millions of Chinese-manufactured toys covered in lead paint); Ian Urbina, No Survivors 
Found After West Virginia Mine Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1; Leslie Wayne, The 
Enemy at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at B1 (reporting on noxious and corrosive sulfur-
infused drywall imported from China); Aaron Clark et al., Tesoro Refinery Blast Kills 5, May 
Be Worst Since ‘05 (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2010, 12:49 EDT), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFn6ib6Jhg6w&pos=8; Jared A. Favole & 
Alicia Mundy, FDA Cites Two Chinese Heparin Makers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2009, 5:51 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123999583350129829.html; Ryan Knutson, Blast at BP Texas 
Refinery in ‘05 Foreshadowed Gulf Disaster, PROPUBLICA (July 27, 2010, 10:30 PM), http:// 
www.propublica.org/article/blast-at-bp-texas-refinery-in-05-foreshadowed-gulf-disaster. 
 2. See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., Drilling for Certainty, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, 
at A23. 
 3. See, e.g., Issa Makes Submissions Reflecting Input from Job Creators on Regulatory 
Barriers to Job Creation Public, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, http:// 
oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1115&Itemid=29 (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2011) (results of an initiative by Representative Darrell Issa to identify 
regulations to target). Representative Issa wrote approximately 160 trade associations repre-
senting large, medium, and small businesses, and solicited their “assistance in identifying 
existing and proposed regulations that have negatively impacted job growth in [their] mem-
bers’ industry.” See Issa’s Letter to Business Groups, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011, 11:28 EST), 
http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/01/04/5763871-issas-letter-to-business-groups. 
 4. See, e.g., SIDNEY SHAPIRO ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REGULATORY 
DYSFUNCTION: HOW INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES, OUTDATED LAWS, AND POLITICAL 
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industry to implement redundant, fail-safe mechanisms to protect public 
health and the environment. Spills, explosions, tainted food, dangerous 
products, and unhealthy air pollution represent chronic failures by govern-
ment to prevent conduct that unfortunately lies in the mainstream of 
business as usual.  
During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama repeatedly declared 
that the role of government is to help people when they cannot help them-
selves,5 raising the strong expectation that he would sponsor affirmative 
reform to prevent the damage produced by the sharper edges of a capitalist 
economy. This explanation—advocating forceful intervention in situations 
where well-organized special interests cause irrevocable harm that indi-
vidual citizens cannot deter—evocatively promised that, if elected, 
candidate Obama would adopt fundamentally different policies than his 
predecessors. The President’s health care initiative and his push to reform 
financial markets reinforced the impression that active intervention to 
strengthen government would be his administration’s prevailing mode.6 
But despite his selection of experienced and well-respected appoin-
tees to lead the eight protector agencies created to protect public health, 
worker safety, and the environment7—most notably, Lisa Jackson at the 
                                                                                                                      
INTERFERENCE CRIPPLE THE “PROTECTOR AGENCIES” (2009), available at http://www. 
progressivereform.org/articles/RegDysfunction_906.pdf.  
 5. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Closing Argument Speech at the Canton Memorial Civic 
Center (Oct. 27, 2008) (transcript available at http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/10/ 
obama_closing_argument_speech_1.html). 
 6. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, 
with a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19; Edward Wyatt, Veto Threat Raised Over 
Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at B1. 
 7. The eight agencies include, in the order of the approximate sizes of their work-
force: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); the Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration (MSHA); the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE); the 
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA); and the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC). EPA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $7.6 
billion and 17,252 “full-time equivalent” (FTE) staff positions. See EPA, FY 2010 BUDGET 
IN BRIEF 7 (2009), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey= 
P10093CX.txt. FDA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $2 billion and 8,524 
FTEs. FDA, FY 2011 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET REQUEST ALL PURPOSE TABLE—BUDGET 
AUTHORITY, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/ 
BudgetReports/UCM202313.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). NRC’s enacted FY 2009 
budget totaled approximately $1 billion and 3,848 FTEs. NRC, 2009–2010 INFORMATION 
DIGEST 12–13 (2009), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/ 
staff/sr1350/v21/sr1350v21.pdf. MSHA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $347 
million and 2,361 FTEs. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION: MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 4, http://www.dol.gov/dol/ 
budget/2011/PDF/CBJ-2011-V2-12.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). OSHA’s enacted FY 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Margaret Hamburg at the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), and David Michaels at the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)—President Obama did not 
make lasting commitments to substantially increase their budgets, support 
them when they ran into political trouble, or update the outmoded laws 
that undermine their efforts to police corporate misconduct.8 
In the aftermath of the 2010 midterm elections, with conservatives 
firmly in charge of the House of Representatives and already mounting an 
attack on regulations that allegedly cripple the economy, President Obama 
pivoted from neglect to repudiation, publishing an opinion piece in the Wall 
Street Journal promising to create a “21st-century” system that eliminates 
                                                                                                                      
2009 budget totaled approximately $513 million and 2,147 FTEs. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 
2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION 4, http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2011/PDF/CBJ-2011-V2-11.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2011). In 2011, BOEMRE had 1,172 FTEs. BOEMRE, CONTINGENCY 
PLAN IN THE EVENT OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 2, http://www.doi.gov/ 
shutdown/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=240494 (last visited Aug. 25, 
2011). NHTSA’s enacted FY 2009 budget totaled approximately $935 million and 607 
FTEs. NHTSA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUDGET ESTIMATES: FISCAL YEAR 2010, 12, 14, 
http://www.dot.gov/budget/2010/budgetestimates/nhtsa.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
CPSC does not report enacted budget levels. In FY 2009, it reported an appropriation 
totaling approximately $105 million and 483 FTEs. CPSC, 2010 PERFORMANCE BUDGET 
REQUEST, at vi (2009), http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/reports/2010plan.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2011). Apparent discrepancies between the size of an agency’s budget appropria-
tions and its full-time staff are explained by the fact that they commit significant amounts of 
their budgets on state grants. The total staff for all eight agencies was 36,433. 
 8. Modest increases in some agency budgets were proposed but were quickly 
eclipsed by deficit politics, with the President hastening to make deals with Republicans and 
paving the way for deep cuts in the funding available to implement those protections. See, 
e.g., Jim Efstathiou, EPA Budget Cut Will Restrict Enforcement of Clean-Air Rules, Activists Say, 
BLOOMBERG (April 12, 2011, 4:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-12/ 
epa-budget-cut-will-restrict-enforcement-of-clean-air-rules-activists-say.html; Laura Wal-
ther, FY 2012 Budget Request Includes $583 Million for OSHA, EHS TODAY (Feb. 15, 2011, 
11:43 AM), http://ehstoday.com/standards/osha/budget-request-includes-millions-osha-0215/. 
The President has not defended the mission of the agencies or the performance of the 
people he appointed to lead them in the face of blistering Republican attacks on over-
regulation, except in the context of explaining how far he is willing to go to eliminate 
unnecessarily burdensome regulations. See, e.g., Alan Fram, Obama’s Push to Revamp Regula-
tions, WASH. POST, May 30, 2011, at A21 (“Overall, the drive would save hundreds of 
millions of dollars annually for companies, governments and individuals and eliminate 
millions of hours of paperwork while maintaining health and safety protections for Ameri-
cans, White House officials said.”). The President was missing in action during 
congressional debate regarding legislation to strengthen regulation of deepwater oil produc-
tion and mine safety. This approach was emblematic of the administration’s reluctance to put 
much political capital on the line in the health, safety, and environmental arena. See, e.g., 
Vicki Smith, MSHA to Congress: Mine Safety Laws Need to Be Stronger, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 3, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/03/msha-congress-mine-
safety_n_830841.html (“MSHA chief Joe Main . . . told the chairman, Republican Rep. Tim 
Walberg of Michigan, he was not recommending any particular legislation.”). 
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“dumb” rules and avoids “excessive, inconsistent, and redundant regulation.”9 
His State of the Union Address a few days later supported a five-year 
freeze on domestic spending, ensuring that his administration will be hard 
pressed to address the woefully inadequate funding that cripples agencies 
assigned to protect public health, ensure worker and consumer safety, and 
safeguard the environment.10 All hope of affirmative law reform disap-
peared until at least after the 2012 presidential election. 
The President’s pivot was foreshadowed by his appointment of former 
Harvard law professor Cass Sunstein as his “regulatory czar,” a position 
formally known as the administrator of the Office of Management and 
Budget’s (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 
No regulation that would impose more than $100 million annually in 
projected costs can go into effect without running the gauntlet at OIRA. 
Sunstein, who has strong views on curtailing the economic impact on busi-
ness of health, safety, and environmental laws,11 has continued the tradition 
of OIRA serving as a one-way ratchet for weakening protective rules.12 
This Article argues that centralized White House regulatory review is a 
primary cause of regulatory failure that the nation can well do without. 
Centralized review shoves policymaking behind closed doors, wastes 
increasingly limited government resources, confuses agency priorities, 
demoralizes civil servants, and, worst of all, costs the nation dearly in lost 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
18, 2011, at A17; see also Cass Sunstein, Op-Ed., 21st-Century Regulation: An Update on the 
President’s Reforms, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2011, at A17. 
 10. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) (transcript 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-
union-address). 
 11. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005). Sunstein’s book, Laws of Fear, is an attack on the precautionary principle, 
which Sunstein describes as “literally incoherent” in “its strongest forms.” Id. at 4. He 
explains that the strong form of this principle requires regulation “whenever there is a 
possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting evidence remains 
speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are high.” Id. at 24. He contends 
that powerful and irrational social forces feed average citizens’ overreaction to risk. Because 
non-experts have difficulty factoring in the probability that a risk would occur and instead 
panic in response to harm that has a very small chance of occurring, “the public’s demand for 
government intervention can be greatly affected by probability neglect, so that regulators 
may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions 
are making people relatively insensitive to the (low) probability that dangers will ever come 
to fruition.” Id. at 69. Sunstein sees these reactions as so extreme that he recommends 
keeping the public from influencing government decisions that involve such risks: “[T]here 
is [a risk that] high levels of public participation in technical domains [will] simply heighten 
public fear, with unfortunate consequences for policy.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1161 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 
(2000)). 
 12. See infra notes 230–303 and accompanying text. 
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lives, avoidable illness and injury, and destruction of irreplaceable natural 
resources. The Obama administration’s continuation of centralized review is 
a critical reason why his potentially transformative presidency has ignored 
the urgency of reviving health, safety, and environmental agencies. At the 
rate events are unfolding, this mistake could define his historical legacy in 
the most negative of terms, as it has already defined the legacy of his pre-
decessor, George W. Bush. Instead of perpetuating centralized review, the 
President should recognize that final authority to formulate individual 
regulation belongs with the political appointees who lead the agencies, with 
the President retaining the authority to hire and fire those high-level offi-
cials if they do not do their jobs to his satisfaction. 
Proponents of centralized review include some heavy hitters from the 
legal academy, including Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan; former De-
partment of Justice attorney John Yoo, who was a central architect of 
President George W. Bush’s strategy for invoking executive powers; and 
former Harvard professor Cass Sunstein.13 Other distinguished administra-
tive law and policy scholars similarly defend presidential prerogatives,14 
although a strong minority warns of its shortcomings.15 Most accept as 
                                                                                                                      
 13. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1994) (defending unitary executive theory, although not on constitutional grounds); 
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1995); John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential 
Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435 (1999).  
 14. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 879–82 (2003) (arguing that White House influence 
over the process should be viewed as a welcome development); Christopher C. DeMuth & 
Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 
1080–88 (1986) (defending the Reagan process of regulatory review as a necessary and 
appropriate exercise of presidential power); John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory 
State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2006) (explain-
ing how centralized review creates cost-effective rules); Robert Hahn & Robert E. Litan, 
Why Congress Should Increase Funding for OMB Review of Regulations, BROOKINGS (Oct. 
2003), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/10_ombregulation_litan.aspx (extolling the 
virtues of a robust economic analysis of rules prompted by OIRA oversight). 
 15. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006) (refuting the assumptions that agencies are captured 
by stakeholders and that OIRA is immune from such pressures); Cynthia R. Farina, False 
Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 
12 J. CONST. L. 357 (2010) (contending that the President is poorly equipped to make the 
expert judgments that Congress delegated directly to the regulatory agencies); Kevin M. 
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 263 
(2006) (arguing that an express delegation of authority to an agency administrator dimin-
ishes the President’s power to undertake centralized regulatory review that requires 
substantive changes in rule proposals); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (decrying the intrusive-
ness of White House politicization of the administrative process). 
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dogma that the President must exert rigorous, day-to-day control over 
regulatory policy making.16 They further argue that cost-benefit analysis 
must reign supreme in regulatory decision making and that OIRA must 
enforce that discipline.17 In contrast, I contend that OIRA, with all the 
flaws inherent in its mission and institutional design, occupies such a cen-
tral role in the President’s universe that it blinds the White House to the 
existence of agency dysfunction and regulatory failure and prevents a 
concerted, desperately needed response to that far more significant phe-
nomenon. To avoid confusing this crucial point, the following discussion 
shoves to one side the question of whether the defective methodology of 
cost-benefit analysis should continue to preoccupy regulatory agencies.18 
Part I makes the case that under-regulation is an important and urgent 
crisis confronting the nation and discusses the root causes of this condition. 
Part II reviews the history of centralized review. From its antecedent as an 
informal process that gave business executives and sympathetic political 
aides a major voice in regulatory policy during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
administrations, to its modern role as the headquarters of withering eco-
nomic analysis of highly speculative regulatory costs, OIRA has fostered 
deep suspicion of health, safety, and environmental agencies among White 
House staff. This suspicion slowed the agencies’ momentum in their heyday 
and has accelerated their decline. Part III examines the consequences of 
these trends, concluding that they not only forestall badly needed affirma-
tive regulation, but squander opportunities to solve problems before they 
become intractable. 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14; Graham et al., supra note 14; Hahn & 
Litan, supra note 14. 
 17. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14; Graham et al., supra note 14; Hahn & 
Litan, supra note 14. 
 18. Cost-benefit analysis, which seems firmly entrenched, is justly criticized on 
factual, legal, methodological, and ethical grounds, and I am no fan of it. But OIRA does 
not write such analyses for individual rules; rather, those tasks are handled by robust groups 
of economists working within the agencies. A proposal to abandon OIRA’s role in reviewing 
individual rules does not prevent the President from continuing to require that cost-benefit 
analyses be conducted. For a discussion of the problems with the methodology, see FRANK 
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING 
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING 
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 
(1991); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003). 
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I. REGULATORY FAILURE 
A. Dysfunction and Failure Defined 
My working definition of agency dysfunction is a condition character-
ized by the emergence of chronic, severe, and distinct patterns of incapacity 
to fulfill statutory missions, as opposed to circumstances where an agency 
program is ineffective a handful of times. Weakness in one or two programs 
does not rise to the level of dysfunction, especially if an agency takes reme-
dial action to resolve these problems before they threaten its credibility. 
When a pattern of poor performance remains unaddressed, gradually de-
veloping into chronic weakness in standard setting and enforcement that 
threatens workers, consumers, and breathers generally,19 as well as a regu-
lated industry as a whole,20 an agency is on the cusp of dysfunction. A 
dysfunctional agency presiding over a cluster of hazardous industrial prac-
tices creates conditions ripe for regulatory failure. So, for example, when a 
set of circumstances emerges that could cause death, injury, and damage to 
the environment, and the agency assigned to prevent these conditions is so 
dysfunctional that it lacks the capacity to avert the threat, regulatory 
failure is imminent. The Deepwater Horizon spill was preceded by weak or 
non-existent safety rules and infrequent, ineffective inspections. The Big 
Branch mine disaster was preceded by chronic violations of safety standards 
and enforcement so anemic that the corporate operator had no incentive to 
prevent the accident.21 This Article addresses instances of severe regulatory 
failure that have occurred, as well as those that are imminent.  
Conservative deregulators implicitly justify dysfunction by ignoring 
the detailed statutory mandates Congress assigned to the agencies. This 
ultra-pragmatic, extra-legal approach, articulated in its most extreme form 
by activist Grover Norquist when he announced his goal as getting  
government “down to the size where we can drown it in the bath tub,”22 
also weakens the nation’s political fabric. Rendering statutory provisions  
                                                                                                                      
 19. “Breathers” is used to connote citizens who, in their lives apart from work, are 
exposed to environmental pollution of the air, water, and soil. “Consumers” are the same 
people, but those who are exposed to hazards as a result of purchasing products, drugs, or 
food. 
 20. For example, the peanut industry lost an estimated $1 billion as a result of the 
2008 Peanut Corporation of America salmonella recall. See, e.g., Christopher Doering, 
Salmonella Recall is No Small Peanuts, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2009, 2:57 PM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2009/03/11/us-salmonella-peanuts-smallbusiness-idUSTRE52A61T20090311.  
 21. See, e.g., Steven Mufson et al., Mine Cited for Litany of Safety Violations, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1. 
 22. Robert Dreyfuss, Grover Norquist: ‘Field Marshal’ of the Bush Tax Plan, NATION, 
May 14, 2001, at 11, 14. 
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symbolic but leaving them on the books cannot help but corrode the pub-
lic’s confidence in government.  
For the relevant statutes to work as intended, failing agencies must be 
rescued by the President, the Congress, and their own managers. When 
none of these institutions launch effective revival efforts, a final symptom 
of agency dysfunction is manifested. Most of the major health, safety, and 
environmental statutes were developed in response to signature events; 
headline-grabbing tragedies used to be followed by law reform.23 But this 
dynamic has virtually disappeared. Neither Congress nor the President has 
exerted leadership to respond to the virtually unregulated hazards of deep-
water oil production or deteriorating conditions in underground mining.24 
In fact, of all the examples of dysfunction mentioned at the outset of this 
Article and explained further below, only two led to the passage of legisla-
tion. The recall of dangerous toys prompted passage of the Consumer 
                                                                                                                      
 23. An early and notable example is the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist fire, which led to the 
enactment of workplace safety laws. See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, Editorial, A Fire that Still 
Burns Bright, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2011, at A19. There are several more recent examples. 
The leakage of the Love Canal’s industrial waste into nearby residential basements provoked 
the enactment of the nation’s toxic waste cleanup law. See, for example, Senator Moynihan’s 
statement in 126 CONG. REC. 30,937–39 (1980), which provides a background and chronolo-
gy of seventy-one “discrete events . . . before . . . there was an effective and reasonably 
complete response” following “the discovery of trichlorophenols and other hazardous substanc-
es” at Love Canal. The statement was delivered during a debate on the Stafford-Randolph 
compromise bill, which was eventually modified and enacted as the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 
2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628, 9651–9662, 9671–9675 (2006 & Supp. 
II 2008)). Disasters including the Cuyahoga River catching on fire prompted passage of a 
far stronger version of the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, 
and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. 
REV. 2279, 2282–90 (1996). The Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2006)), was “significantly reorganized and 
expanded in 1972. ‘Clean Water Act’ became the Act’s common name with amendments in 
1977.” Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/regulations/ 
laws/cwa.html (last updated Aug. 11, 2011). Trees stunted by acid rain in New England and 
Canadian forests produced the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 
104 Stat. 2399. 
 24. Robin Bravender & Katie Howell, Fallout Begins After Senate’s Failure to Act on 
Energy, Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/05/ 
05greenwire-fallout-begins-after-senates-failure-to-act-on-54000.html (“After the worst oil 
leak in U.S. history and months of heated negotiations on energy and spill-response legisla-
tion, senators will head home for the August recess empty-handed.”); Kim Geiger et al., 
Miners’ Survivors Feel Let Down: A Year After a Blast Killed 29, a Safety Bill has Failed and 
Efforts to Boost Enforcement are Mired in Appeals, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2011, at A18 (“ ‘We’ve 
been messing around for a year,’ said Rep. George Miller (D- Martinez), who introduced a 
bill last summer that would have dealt with the backlog and other issues brought to light by the 
deadly explosion. ‘The sad thing is that nothing will happen until the next major disaster.’ ”). 
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Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) in 2008,25 but the new law 
ducked the most pressing issues, doing little to strengthen the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) capacity to tackle the threats posed 
by imported products, and the Republican-controlled House of Representa-
tives is considering legislation to weaken it even further.26 And although 
salmonella and E. coli outbreaks in food provoked passage of the Food 
Safety Modernization Act in 2010,27 congressional conservatives immedi-
ately threatened to defund the new law’s implementation, and deep cuts in 
the new programs created by the statute seem inevitable in the current, 
politically charged fiscal climate.28  
Deeming an agency dysfunctional in achieving its statutory missions 
necessarily depends upon subjective judgment. The continuum of regulato-
ry failure is finegrained and reasonable observers could differ on when 
oversights and mistakes degenerate into dysfunction. To circumvent disa-
greements about whether the lines drawn here are reasonable, the following 
discussion features cases that cannot reasonably be considered close. 
Several of these examples involve explosions that are easier to recog-
nize as catastrophes than the relatively slow poisoning of a child who 
mouths her lead paint-coated toys. Of course, an accident could happen in 
the best of regulatory systems. But the major industrial disasters discussed 
in this Article cannot be so easily dismissed: none of the extensive analyses 
of those incidents referenced here have ever come close to concluding that a 
responsible company with a strong safety culture that operated in a rigorous 
regulatory environment was simply ambushed by a freak instance of bad 
luck. Instead, report after report concludes that the absence of a strong 
                                                                                                                      
 25. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 
Stat. 3016 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (Supp. II 2008)). 
 26. See Congress Should Not Weaken the CPSIA, CONSUMERS UNION (May 11, 2011), 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_product_safety/017727.html.  
 27. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). See also Margaret Hamburg, Food Safety Mod-
ernization Act: Putting the Focus on Prevention, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 3, 2011, 4:53 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/01/03/food-safety-modernization-act-putting-focus-
prevention.  
 28. The new law requires CPSC to develop a risk assessment methodology for identi-
fying potentially dangerous products being shipped into the U.S. within two years of its 
date of enactment, which was August 14, 2010. See 15 U.S.C. § 2066. The CPSC website 
does not indicate that this mandate has been fulfilled. See Section 222. Import Safety Manage-
ment and Interagency Cooperation, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM’N, http:// 
www.cpsc.gov/about/cpsia/sect222.html#presentations (last visited May 18, 2011). Republi-
cans have also threatened to defund FDA food safety initiatives. Suzy Khimm, These GOP 
Budget Cuts Might Make You Puke (or Worse): How Food Safety Could Fall Victim to the Republi-
cans’ Budget-Slashing Mania, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 9, 2011, 1:01 AM), http:// 
motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/gop-budget-cuts-food-safety.  
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regulatory presence and corporate neglect of safety at the highest levels 
were proximate causes for accidents that were waiting to happen.29 
B. Dysfunction and Failure Epitomized 
1. Nuclear Plant Maintenance 
The tsunami that hit Japan in the spring of 2011 triggered a nuclear cri-
sis that experts attribute to a shockingly lax regulatory system. Japanese 
regulators and the companies they oversee follow a practice known as 
amakudari, or “descent from heaven,” that provides retired government 
officials with “comfortable jobs at the companies they regulated.”30 The 
practice is a symptom of the nuclear industry’s status as one of Japan’s 
“most entrenched and coddled interest groups.”31 
Thankfully, the Japan disaster prompted intensive investigative report-
ing by the New York Times on the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), which oversees America’s 104 nuclear power plants. 
The conclusions were disconcerting to say the least, especially given fervent 
bipartisan support for a dramatic expansion of nuclear power in this coun-
try, including President Obama’s pledge to subsidize the industry to the 
tune of billions of dollars.32  
Workers at the Byron nuclear plant in Illinois noticed in the fall of 
2007 that piping used to circulate cooling water to essential emergency 
equipment had corroded through and started to leak, causing a twelve-day 
shutdown of the plant’s two reactors.33 The plant’s operator, the Exelon 
Corporation, had known for years that the piping was degrading, but rather 
than changing out the corroded equipment, the company kept downgrading 
its internal guidance on the minimum thickness required for safety.34 The 
NRC had failed to inspect the piping for the eight years preceding the leak 
                                                                                                                      
 29. See e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, at vii (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L 
COMM’N ON DEEPWATER HORIZON]. 
 30. Martin Fackler & Hiroko Tabuchi, Lag in Closing a Japanese Nuclear Plant Reflects 
Erosion of a Culture of Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2011, at A4.  
 31. Id.; Yuri Kageyama & Justin Pritchard, Ties Bind Japan Nuke Sector, Regulators, 
ABC NEWS (May 2, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13502692. 
 32. See, e.g., Matthew Mosk, Environmental Groups Question Obama’s Support for Nuclear 
Industry, ABC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/obamas-support-
nuclear-industry-questioned/story?id=13158078 (reporting, among other evidence of the 
President’s long-standing support for nuclear power, that he is especially close to Exelon, a 
nuclear power company headquartered in Chicago).  
 33. Tom Zeller, Jr., Nuclear Agency Beset by Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, May 8 2011, at A1. 
 34. Id. 
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and, even when the problem came to regulators’ attention, they decided 
only to “reprimand [Exelon] for two low-level violations.”35 If enough pipes 
had ruptured during a reactor accident, “the result could easily have been a 
nuclear catastrophe at a plant just 100 miles west of Chicago.”36 Concluding 
that this troubling episode was symptomatic of pervasive problems at the 
NRC, the New York Times noted that “most of the country’s 104 aging 
reactors are applying for, and receiving, 20-year extensions from the N.R.C 
[sic] on their original 40-year licenses” and that reform advocates contend 
that “a thorough review of the system is urgently needed.”37 David Loch-
baum, a reactor technology expert who has trained NRC personnel, told the 
newspaper: “The only difference between Byron and Fukushima is luck.”38 
2. Deepwater Oil Production 
Less than a year before the Japanese nuclear meltdown, the Deepwater 
Horizon, a drilling rig owned by Transocean and leased by British Petroleum 
(BP) exploded. Eleven workers were killed by the raging fires that destroyed 
the rig, and, over the course of several weeks, an estimated 205 million 
gallons of crude oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico as the company and its 
contractors struggled to gain control over the gushing well.39  
The subsequent investigation revealed BP’s dismal track record for safety 
during the decade preceding the spill.40 Detailed chronologies of the events 
preceding the explosion reveal cost-cutting measures with grave and sys-
tematically ignored implications for safety. For example, four days before 
volatile gases surged into the well and caused the explosion, BP employees 
rejected a recommendation by employees of its contractor, Halliburton, that 
                                                                                                                      
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see also Susan Q. Stranahan, A More Likely Nuclear Nightmare, IWATCH NEWS 
(May 11, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/05/11/4540/more-likely-nuclear-
nightmare (explaining that the risk of fires at the 104 U.S. nuclear power plants was a 
growing threat because even a small fire could trigger a meltdown but that the NRC “hardly 
ever issues serious penalties for fires,” preferring to rely on “voluntary compliance and slaps 
on the wrist”).  
 38. Zeller, supra note 33. 
 39. See, e.g., Bradley Blackburn, BP Oil Spill: Families Gather to Honor 11 Who Died, 
Express Frustration with BP, Transocean, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
WN/bp-oil-spill-transocean-holds-memorial-11-lost/story?id=10739080; Maureen Hoch, New 
Estimate Puts Gulf Oil Leak at 205 Million Gallons, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 2, 2010,  
10:07 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/08/new-estimate-puts-oil-leak-at-
49-million-barrels.html.  
 40. Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, a History of Boldness and Costly Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2010, at A1 (“Despite a catalog of crises and near misses in recent years, BP has been 
chronically unable or unwilling to learn from its mistakes, an examination of the record 
shows.”). 
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twenty-one centralizers be installed to secure the well against such risks.41 
“ ‘It will take 10 hours to install them,’ a BP official said in an internal  
e-mail. ‘I do not like this.’ ”42 
The expert commission appointed by President Obama to investigate 
the spill resisted strong oil industry pressure43 to brand BP a “rogue” com-
pany, concluding: 
The blowout was not the product of . . . aberrational decisions 
made by rogue industry or government officials . . . . [T]he root 
causes are systemic and, absent significant reform . . . might well 
recur. The missteps were rooted in systemic failures by industry 
management (extending beyond BP to contractors that serve many 
in the industry), and also by failures of government to provide ef-
fective regulatory oversight . . . .44 
Regulatory failure included the grave mistake of housing the Department 
of the Interior’s (DOI) entrepreneurial oil leasing program in the same 
office as the skeletal regulatory staff of the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS), which was responsible for policing the safety of offshore platforms 
and rigs.45 The employees who worked in the leasing unit had a perverse 
relationship with oil industry executives that included drunken parties and 
sexual liaisons.46 This blatant corruption created an atmosphere where 
aggressive regulation of deepwater safety by staff on the other side of the 
office was systematically undermined. Even after the advent of the spill, the 
Obama administration’s response was to divide the two offices into separate 
divisions for leasing and regulatory oversight, but to leave them reporting 
to the same boss: DOI Secretary Kenneth Salazar.47 Significant increases in 
funding to support adequate inspections has not been forthcoming; as of 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Knutson, supra note 1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Oil Executives Break Ranks in Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 
16, 2010, at A20 (“The chairmen of four of the world’s largest oil companies broke their 
nearly two-month silence on the major spill in the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday and publicly 
blamed BP for mishandling the well that caused the disaster.”).  
 44. NAT’L COMM’N ON DEEPWATER HORIZON, supra note 29, at 122. 
 45. Id. at 55; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Swears-In Michael R. 
Bromwich to Lead Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement 
(June 21, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Swears- 
In-Michael-R-Bromwich-to-Lead-Bureau-of-Ocean-Energy-Management-Regulation-and-
Enforcement-Secretarial-Order-begins-reorganization-of-former-mms.cfm. 
 46. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Minerals Service Had a Mandate to Produce Results, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A1 (“The causes of the spill remain unclear, but a number of the 
agency’s actions have drawn fire . . . . The story has gained a bacchanal gloss because agency 
employees in Louisiana and Colorado took meals, gifts and sporting trips paid for by the 
industry, and several Colorado officials had sex and used drugs with industry employees.”). 
 47. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 45. 
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June 2011, seventy-nine inspectors were trying to cover all of the site visits 
to some 3,500 rigs and platforms.48 The extraordinarily difficult task of 
conducting meaningful inspections is made even more challenging by the 
fact that these facilities are located many miles offshore.49 Investigative 
reporting by the Wall Street Journal noted that a “small cadre” of inspectors 
armed with “checklists and pencils” had failed to make much of a dent in 
overseeing offshore operations throughout the Gulf: 
[T]hese inspectors have been overruled by industry, undermined by 
their own managers, and outmatched by the sheer number of offshore 
installations they oversee. Inspectors come into the job with little 
or no hands-on experience in deep-water drilling, learning as they 
go. 
[They] are largely checking hardware [and] get good marks for  
reducing workplace injuries on rigs and platforms. But safety experts 
say the main causes of major accidents are almost always human  
error, not the mechanical failures that inspectors focus on. Inspectors 
aren’t looking for signs of systemic safety problems—poor deci-
sions, cutting corners, muddled responsibilities—that investigators 
are linking to the Deepwater Horizon explosion . . . . 
No one knows if a more robust and sophisticated inspection pro-
gram could have detected [the problems that caused the Deepwater 
Horizon] explosion. But there is broad agreement among safety 
experts that a massive overhaul is needed to create the kind of  
inspection program that can help avoid such disasters in the  
future.50 
3. Underground Mining Hazards 
The same month as the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the worst mine 
disaster in forty years killed twenty-nine men in Montcoal, West Virginia 
at the Upper Big Branch facility owned by Massey Energy, a perennial 
violator of mine safety laws.51 The accident was caused by a buildup of 
methane gas that exploded, causing shafts a thousand feet deep to collapse.52 
                                                                                                                      
 48. Ben Geman, Interior Beefs Up Offshore Inspections with Multiperson Teams, HILL 
BLOG (June 13, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/166105-
interior-beefs-up-offshore-inspections-with-multi-person-teams.  
 49. See Leslie Eaton et al., Inspectors Adrift in Rig-Safety Push, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 
2010, at A1. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Urbina, supra note 1. 
 52. See, e.g., Mufson et al., supra note 21.  
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The Department of Justice charged the mine’s security chief with two 
felonies for making false statements and obstructing justice, and President 
Obama said, “We cannot bring back the men we lost. What we can do, in 
their memory, is thoroughly investigate this tragedy and demand accounta-
bility.”53 
In the spring of 2010, a team led by J. Davitt McAteer, who headed 
MSHA under President Clinton, reported to the Governor of West Virginia 
on the causes of the Big Branch tragedy.54 Like the reports on BP’s track 
record before the Deepwater Horizon spill, the investigation revealed that 
MSHA inspectors had previously discovered serious violations in the sys-
tems that failed spectacularly during the Big Branch explosion, including 
incidents involving the accumulation of explosive methane gas, the mal-
functioning of required ventilation systems, and the failure to clear coal 
dust from active mineshafts in order to prevent it from becoming a fire-
spreading fuel during an explosion.55 The inspectors issued routine citations 
against the company, but did not manage to use their ample enforcement 
authority with enough force to deter the continuation of these life-
threatening conditions.56 This passivity is made all the more remarkable by 
the fact that Massey Energy had the worst fatality record in the country: 
during the period from 2000 to 2010, fifty-four of its miners died on the 
job.57 
A little over a year after the Big Branch tragedy, MSHA undertook a 
surprise inspection at another Massey mine in West Virginia.58 The inspec-
tors discovered two dozen safety violations that could trigger fires and 
explosions and ordered the evacuation of all miners from threatened por-
tions of the facility.59 “The conduct and behavior exhibited when we caught 
the mine operator by surprise is nothing short of outrageous,” said MSHA 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Upper Big Branch Security Chief Charged with 
Additional Count of Making False Statement to MSHA Investigative Team (May 17, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/wvs/press_releases/May%202011/51711Stover%20 
press%20release.pdf (charging Hughie Stover, Chief of Security at Upper Big Branch, with a 
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sion); Press Release, The White House, Statement by President Obama on the Big Branch 
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president-obama-upper-big-branch-mine.  
 54. J. DAVITT MCATEER, ET AL., UPPER BIG BRANCH (2011), available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/20/us/20110520_MINE_REPORT_DOC.html. 
 55. Id. at 16. 
 56. Id. at 82–84. 
 57. Id. at 93.  
 58. Howard Berkes, Serious Safety Lapses Shut Down Parts of Massey Coal Mine, 
NPR BLOG (May 3, 2011, 10:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/05/04/ 
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head Joe Main.60 Meanwhile, the Los Angeles Times reported about a week 
later, the agency was making little progress on a backlog of nineteen thou-
sand pending appeals of citations for safety violations filed by mining 
companies.61 A provision in the law allows companies to avoid penalties 
that might motivate more diligent compliance while their appeals are pend-
ing.62 MSHA’s inability to process those appeals further undermines its 
effectiveness.  
The Massey Energy example drives home the reality that federal regu-
lators have gotten to the point that they cannot effectively cope with 
chronic and egregious violations by companies that regard the regulatory 
system with disdain, even after catastrophes that should put an end to such 
lethargy.  
4. Coal Ash Dumps 
In the early morning hours of December 22, 2008, an earthen dam 
holding back an eighty-acre “surface impoundment” (the technocratic  
euphemism for a water-logged dump dug into the ground) at a Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) power plant broke, releasing 1.1 billion gallons of 
inky coal ash sludge across Kingston, Tennessee and neighboring towns.63 
The flood crossed a river, damaging more than one hundred homes and 
infiltrating several streams that bisected the area, ultimately covering three 
hundred acres in four to five feet of sludge and mud. Miraculously, no one 
was killed. In the aftermath of the disaster, EPA Administrator Lisa Jack-
son promised to re-evaluate the agency’s decades-old reluctance to regulate 
the disposal of some 144 million tons of coal ash generated annually, vowing 
to issue her conclusions within a year.64 Jackson met this deadline, but her 
efforts were derailed when an intensive industry lobbying campaign pro-
voked OIRA to rewrite the EPA proposal, adding two significantly weaker 
options and derailing the momentum of the rule: it will not see the light of 
day until later this year, at the earliest.65 
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Several highly toxic constituents are present in trace amounts in coal, 
including cadmium, chromium, lead, and mercury; burning the fuel  
concentrates these contaminants in the ash left after combustion.66 When 
coal ash is disposed in leaking dumps, these materials migrate into soil and 
water, threatening people and wildlife.67  
The threat of another catastrophe along the lines of the Kingston spill 
is particularly acute for surface impoundments: some 186 of the 584 such 
facilities estimated to be operating in the U.S. were not designed by a 
professional engineer; 56 impoundments are older than fifty years, 96 are 
older than forty years, and 340 are somewhere between twenty-six and 
forty years old.68 EPA has characterized forty-nine coal ash dump sites in 
several different states as having high hazard potential, including the Little 
Blue Run ash basin in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, which is thirty times 
larger than the Kingston facility.69 
Unless and until a protective federal rule goes into effect, regulation of 
coal ash disposal sites will remain the province of the states, which have a 
checkered track record on controlling leakage and preventing spills. State 
environmental agencies vary widely in the resources they have available and 
the stringency of the regulations they have adopted to supplement the floor 
of federal requirements. So, for example, a federal government study found 
that in the eleven states where coal-fired power plants produce half the ash 
generated nationwide, approximately thirty percent of such waste is poten-
tially exempt from regulation.70  
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5. Tainted Food 
In the fall of 2008, a high number of illnesses and deaths caused by 
salmonella poisoning71 alerted Minnesota health officials that they should 
commence a “trace-back” study, an arduous process that involves detailed 
interviews with people who have become ill to discover common food 
sources.72 Public health graduate students who worked for the state part-
time and were jokingly called the “Diarrhea Squad”73 discovered that 
peanut products supplied to schools, nursing homes, and other institutions 
and manufactured by the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) were the 
culprits.74 The paste, which was used in more than 2,000 categories of 
products, ultimately killed nine and sickened thousands.75  
PCA had two processing plants: one in Blakely, Georgia and a second 
in Plainview, Texas. Investigations by the media and congressional overseers 
determined that the Blakely plant operators knowingly shipped the contam-
inated products to their customers after the paste had tested positive for 
salmonella.76 The Texas plant operated without a required state license and 
had not been inspected by state officials for nearly four years.77 The Geor-
gia plant was awash in outright safety violations and bad management 
practices, including a leaking roof, mold growing on ceilings and walls, 
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2009, at A14 (reporting on the closure of the Texas plant and interviews with its former 
employees who said it was “disgusting” and shared many of the problems reported about the 
Georgia plant); Martin, supra note 75. 
  
228 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
rodent infestation, filthy nut processing receptacles, feathers and feces in its 
air filtration system, and a broken roaster used to sterilize the peanuts 
before they were ground into paste.78  
Georgia state inspectors, who were contracted to inspect their state’s 
food processors by the FDA, visited the plant multiple times from 2006–08 
without forcing a halt to these practices.79 Both plants closed, the company 
declared bankruptcy, and FDA officials opened a criminal investigation.80 
Two years later, PCA’s chief executive officer was discovered serving as a 
consultant to the peanut industry.81 As mentioned earlier, a lame-duck 
Democratic-controlled Congress did manage to pass legislation strengthening 
the FDA’s regulatory authority over the domestic food industry, but House 
Republicans almost immediately launched efforts to defund these pro-
grams.82  
6. Dangerous Imports 
During 2007, manufacturers and retailers agreed to recall millions of 
toys from store shelves and homes following the discovery that these Chi-
nese imports were coated with lead paint;83 paint made with lead is two 
thirds cheaper in China than the safe variety.84 Toy industry experts pre-
dicted that such large, attention-grabbing recalls would continue.85 After 
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all, an astounding eighty percent of toys sold in America are manufactured 
in China, which has no effective regulatory systems.86 Chinese executives 
admitted that their government does not inspect factories and that, alt-
hough a national standard theoretically limits lead levels in consumer 
products, no one enforces it.87  
Few subsequent recalls have occurred in the United States, raising the 
specter that ongoing problems have overwhelmed CPSC, the smallest and 
most dysfunctional of the protector agencies.88 The agency has a miniscule 
annual budget of $105 million despite its responsibility to oversee the safety 
of some fifteen thousand categories of dangerously defective products. This 
scant amount supports approximately 483 Full Time Equivalent employees 
(FTEs),89 in contrast to the 891 FTEs it had on staff in FY 1981. The 
American population increased by thirty-six percent during that same peri-
od.90 
In a similar but more recent episode, sulfur-infused drywall—once 
again imported from China—was installed in thousands of homes through-
out the Southeast.91 Fumes from the poisoned product corroded pipes and 
wiring, ruined new appliances, and caused headaches and severe respiratory 
illness for homeowners and other occupants.92 The problem received wide-
spread media attention, especially in the South, where hot, humid weather 
exacerbated the release of fumes. CPSC has no authority to force Chinese 
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manufacturers to recall the defective drywall and has not even managed  
to determine the origin or extent of the problem.93 When consumers 
complained that the problem was also present in drywall manufactured in 
the United States, CPSC was further embarrassed when it launched an 
investigation of conditions in eleven homes, concluding that five suffered 
from the drywall sulfur problem, but declaring that it was unable to deter-
mine the origin of the offending drywall because it lacked the resources to 
complete the investigation.94 The drywall problem will be left to the tort 
system to resolve, turning the clock back to the days before CPSC and its 
sister agencies were created to prevent such injuries. 
7. Refinery Explosions 
In what should have been a wake-up call for BP’s top managers, a 2005 
explosion killed fifteen at the third-largest refinery in the country, located 
in Texas City, Texas.95 The accident was preceded by numerous warnings 
from company consultants and managers that fatal accidents were the inevi-
table consequence of relentless cost cutting.96 OSHA assessed a fine of $21 
million, one of the largest in the agency’s history. 97 But the company 
ignored the provisions of the consent decree requiring it to make changes 
to the facility’s operations, triggering a subsequent $50 million fine for 
repeat violations.98  
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) filed 
an “investigation report” on the Texas City incident, evaluating OSHA’s 
role in the disaster.99 It found that the agency had conducted several inspec-
tions at the plant, primarily in response to other fatalities, but that it never 
identified the likelihood of such a “catastrophic incident.”100 This omission 
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is especially surprising because the agency discovered “301 egregious 
willful [sic] violations” in the immediate aftermath of the explosion at the 
processing unit that was the origin of the blast.101 Equally incredible, two 
years after the Texas City incident OSHA still had not conducted “a 
comprehensive inspection of any of the other 29 process units at the Texas 
City refinery.”102  
The CSB further concluded that OSHA’s approach to refinery safety 
fell far short of the standards set by other enforcement agencies, including 
state-run programs in Nevada and California, as well as Britain’s Health 
and Safety Executive.103 It estimated that about fifteen thousand facilities 
engage in sufficiently high hazard industrial processes to have a comparable 
potential for a catastrophic incident, but that OSHA only had one small 
team of inspectors competent to discover violations and issue corrective 
orders at such locations.104 Just as the CSB warned might happen, in April 
2010 seven died in an accident at a Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washing-
ton.105 
C. Root Causes 
Dysfunction is a phenomenon that feeds rapaciously on itself, especial-
ly in periods when deregulatory campaigns are waxing. The worse the 
agencies do, the more impassioned the condemnation meted out by their 
critics at both ends of the political spectrum becomes. Paradoxically, health, 
safety, and environmental agencies responsible for policing increasingly 
hazardous activities have seen budgeting that, in constant dollars, has been 
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flat for three decades.106 The more their performance degenerates, the more 
they are abused. During crises, these destructive trends are intensified as, 
for example, when President Obama’s sharpest critics immediately pro-
nounced the Gulf spill his “Hurricane Katrina.”107 
Five root causes rise above all the others as synergistic factors that  
accelerate agency dysfunction: (1) severe funding shortfalls that cripple any 
reasonable efforts to fulfill statutory mandates; (2) outmoded legal authority 
that leaves the agencies without the tools they need to deter irresponsible 
corporate behavior; (3) political opportunism and bureaucracy bashing that 
erodes their credibility and morale; (4) a crisis within the civil service as 
mid-level and senior career managers retire and recruitment of talented 
replacements from the private sector becomes ever more difficult; and  
(5) in a few discrete but notable instances, outright capture of agency per-
sonnel by the industries they regulate. 
1. Funding Shortfalls 
Most of the protector agencies are funded by general taxpayer reve-
nues. The two exceptions are the NRC, which receives ninety percent of its 
funding from licensing fees,108 and the FDA, which gains significant sup-
port for its drug approval109 and food safety110 programs from industry fees. 
Fee-based funding is more likely to produce stability for the agencies in 
difficult economic times because it is immune from the deficit mania 
embraced by both political parties.  
Agencies funded by general taxpayer revenue have experienced steady 
declines in available resources since the mid-1980s, when the severe Reagan 
administration budget cuts took hold.111 In constant dollars, their fiscal 
resources now stand at roughly the same levels as they did at that time, 
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despite the steady growth of the U.S. population and economy, the advent 
of globalization, and the expansion of such high-risk activities as deepwater 
oil production.112 
In addition to deficit mania and indiscriminate attacks on big govern-
ment as an evil in and of itself, another reason why these problems persist 
is the bravado of political appointees. Once the President has finalized his 
budget, his political appointees support it whether or not they are satisfied 
with the resources allotted for their work. Agency heads also appear un-
willing to admit that their agencies labor under the constraints of scant 
funding. Whining about money and its effect on their performance would 
almost certainly earn the enmity of White House staffs that embrace the 
philosophy of never letting anyone see the President—or his team—sweat. 
These realities are increasingly unfortunate because one of the only ways to 
shift the entrenched dynamic of under-funding is for experienced federal 
managers to explain its implications to Congress, the White House, and the 
public. 
2. Inadequate Legal Authority 
Employers who “willfully” disregard safety standards, with the result 
that workers are killed on the job, face a maximum prison term of six 
months, while tourists who “harass” a wild burro or horse in a national park 
face up to one year in jail.113 Up until 2010, the FDA was compelled to coax 
food processors to undertake recalls voluntarily because it lacked authority 
to order the remedy.114 The Clean Water Act does not provide EPA with 
the authority to regulate rain-induced runoff from pesticide and fertilizer-
soaked fields even though these heavily contaminated discharges degrade 
water quality in many locations.115  
Like traditional police departments, the protector agencies lack the 
resources to inspect every regulated facility on a routine basis, and must 
instead rely on a relatively small number of high-profile prosecutions to 
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deter violations by similarly situated companies.116 Dwindling resources 
make such prosecutions difficult to pursue and, as the MSHA backlog of 
nineteen thousand appeals illustrates, companies take full advantage of 
legal loopholes and other opportunities to slow prosecutions down.117 As 
enforcement falters, companies realize that it makes more economic sense 
to ignore legal requirements that will compel expensive capital invest-
ments—for example, the installation of pollution control equipment—and 
run the risk of discovery. Even when caught, the penalties they must pay 
may not cost nearly as much as the original, avoided investment. 
3. Political Abuse, Interference, and Neglect 
Congress is a fickle mistress, quick to defund and even quicker to 
blame the bureaucracy when lack of resources undermines its capacity to 
prevent regulatory failures. Bureaucrats are often first at hand for well-
publicized ridicule by congressional committees when anything goes wrong, 
as well as when agencies attempt to issue stronger requirements to prevent 
such disasters. Although it is difficult to imagine, matters have not improved 
much since former Republican Majority Leader Tom Delay compared EPA 
to the Nazi Gestapo on the House floor.118 Today, House Republican lead-
ers warn the EPA Administrator that they “are reserving a parking space 
for her because she’ll have to make frequent stops to justify her every 
move.”119 
One other aspect of the problem deserves mention. President Obama’s 
administration has been characterized by the appointment of several high-
level “czars,” including Carol Browner, the Clinton-era EPA Administrator 
who preferred to work within the White House instead of asking for her 
old job back. Assigned the ambiguous portfolio of trouble shooting on 
“energy and environment,” Browner was featured in an early story in the 
New York Times introducing the President’s “inner circle,” with the implica-
tion that she was more powerful than EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson.120 
This divided authority did little to assuage poor morale at EPA or other 
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protector agencies. Browner ultimately resigned from her position and has 
not yet been replaced, a positive development for Jackson amongst a tide of 
negative ones.121 
The effect of a countervailing White House center of power on Jack-
son’s credibility and authority is especially important because EPA has 
served as the favorite target for deregulatory movements since it was 
created in 1970.122 Beyond diluting their influence through White House 
czars—the OIRA Administrator is typically referred to as the “regulatory 
czar” by reporters123—it is also difficult to think of a single instance where a 
President affirmatively and publicly defended an EPA Administrator in 
times of trouble, sending a potent message that the agency must go it alone 
when under fire. 
With one notable exception, commentators who support centralized re-
view not only are untroubled by its use to suppress proactive regulation, but 
they also extol the idea that the President must be the ultimate backstop for 
unduly enthusiastic bureaucracies.124 But in an article entitled Presidential 
Administration, then-professor and now-Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan 
argues that the potential for presidential support for an agency’s affirmative 
agenda is a strong argument favoring centralization.125 She explains that 
President Clinton adopted the agenda of FDA Commissioner David Kessler 
to intensify the battle against teen smoking, arguing that this episode illus-
trates how a more supportive version of unitary executive oversight could 
give agencies tremendous credibility.126 This point is true as far as it goes, 
which is far enough to provide a model of behavior for other Presidents but 
not nearly far enough to justify the elaborate system of centralized White 
House review now in operation. For one thing, it is difficult to think of 
another comparable example of such sustained presidential support. For 
another, Kessler’s initiative was decimated by the Supreme Court in FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., which concluded that the agency needed 
congressional authorization to expand its jurisdiction in this matter.127 In 
any event, the use of executive power to support agencies on important 
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issues can occur whether or not the White House pursues centralized regu-
latory review through OIRA. 
 
4. Civil Service Brain Drain 
Political scientist Frances Rourke once wrote: 
The fact that government agencies are having trouble doing their 
work has never been of serious concern in American democracy. 
After all, constitutional arrangements in the United States were 
not designed to smooth the way for the exercise of power by the 
instrumentalities of the state. No amount of antibureaucratic rhet-
oric, however, can obscure the fact that effective national 
policymaking in the United States, as in other democracies, re-
quires that the elected officials responsible for making policy 
decisions receive as much help as possible from the permanent  
organizations of government.128 
Rourke reminds us that the nation’s anxiety about autocratic, distant gov-
ernment is so deeply rooted that the civil service should never harbor the 
expectation of applause or acceptance.129 Nevertheless, the erosion of the 
civil service in recent years is arguably the worst manifestation of public 
distrust since the difficult transition from patronage to professionalism at 
the turn of the last century.130 A series of blue ribbon commissions and 
analysis by political scientists have concluded that civil servants—especially 
those that hold mid-level management positions—are beleaguered by hostile 
congressional oversight, limited positive reinforcement, funding gaps, and 
disparities in public and private pay scales for those with specialized tech-
nical, administrative, and legal expertise.131 Consider the alarmist tone of 
the 2003 National Commission on the Public Service, more commonly 
known as the Volcker Commission because its chairman was Paul Volcker, a 
former head of the Federal Reserve: 
The notion of public service, once a noble calling proudly pur-
sued by the most talented Americans of every generation, draws 
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an indifferent response from today’s young people and repels many 
of the country’s leading private citizens. Those with policy  
responsibility find their decisionmaking frustrated by overlapping 
jurisdictions, competing special interests, and sluggish administra-
tive response . . . . The best are underpaid; the worst, overpaid. 
Too many of the most talented leave the public service too early; 
too many of the least talented stay too long.132 
According to 2008 estimates by the non-partisan Partnership for the Public 
Service, the federal government will lose nearly 530,000 employees by 
2012, largely because it has a workforce aging far faster than that of the 
private sector—58% of federal workers are over forty-five, compared with 
41% in the private sector.133 The Partnership projects that 36% of top civil 
service managers in the Senior Executive Service (SES) will retire by 
2012.134 Similarly, 27% of supervisors who direct daily work throughout the 
government are expected to retire by 2012.135 While most of these retire-
ments are motivated by length of service, morale problems are also acute:  
Far too many talented public servants are abandoning the middle 
levels of government . . . either because they are fed up with the 
constraints of outmoded personnel systems and unmet expecta-
tions for advancement or simply lured away by the substantial 
difference between public and private sector salaries in many  
areas.136 
The implications of this “brain drain” are compounded by the fact that 
downsizing throughout the 1990s reduced the size of the federal workforce 
by 400,000 jobs, leaving many crucial positions unfilled.137 Moreover, even 
these discouraging predictions do not account for the deep budget cuts 
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across the government that seem certain to occur as a result of deficit politics 
in Congress. The loss of experienced managers and attrition in important, 
lower-level positions could undermine the agencies further, making it diffi-
cult to avoid acute dysfunction.  
5. Capture 
Capture, in the traditional sense of the term, is less prominent than 
early administrative law scholars supposed.138 Agencies suffer from resource 
shortfalls, outside political interference, demoralization, and incompetence 
far more often than they succumb to the corruption of being beholden to 
only one group of stakeholders. The irony is that some of the remedies 
thought necessary to defeat capture—extensive judicial review, for example—
have caused new problems, including extensive delays in issuing protective 
regulation.139 Nevertheless, the most corrosive form of capture clearly a 
ffected MMS, as discussed above in the context of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster.140 Clearly, capture remains a potential contributing factor to agency 
dysfunction, especially when regulatory missions are combined with the 
administration of lucrative leasing agreements for extractive industries.  
Why has the Obama administration—and the George H. W. Bush, 
Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations before it—failed to recog-
nize, much less come to grips with, these blatant symptoms of dysfunction 
and failure? A primary factor is OIRA, which serves both as the gatekeeper 
for regulatory proposals to enter the outside world and a distorted window 
through which the White House looks back at the agencies.  
II. THE HISTORY OF CENTRALIZED REVIEW 
Because President Ronald Reagan is widely credited with launching the 
ongoing campaign against big government, casual observers of the regulatory 
process assume that the idea of centralized White House review began with 
his election. In fact, OIRA’s antecedents date further back to the same time 
period in the early 1970s when the protector agencies were first created. This 
historical detail is crucial to an understanding of how OIRA evolved and 
why it became ever more powerful.  
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Environmentalists, organized labor, and consumer advocates played an 
outside game through much of this history, using public sentiment and the 
media to amplify pressure on Congress to create the agencies and steadily 
expand their statutory missions. In the 1990s, such fertile legislative activity 
for the most part ceased. Regulated industries responded with an inside 
game, focusing on the White House staff and leveraging the perceived 
electoral advantages of having business support to impress upon Presidents 
the need to moderate, as quietly as possible, the public interest community’s 
gains. Over the long run, the inside game appears to have been a far more 
effective strategy because it has allowed Presidents to have their political 
cake and eat it too: publicly supporting popular initiatives like environ-
mental protection but placating business interests behind the scenes. Not 
incidentally, public interest groups put their faith in Congress, an institu-
tion that has become increasingly dysfunctional over the years, while  
business interests hedged their bets with the Presidency, which has become 
steadily more powerful. 
A. 1970–1980: “Quality of Life” Reviews 
With the notable exception of the FDA,141 the most important health, 
safety, and environmental agencies were created in the first flush of  
progressive idealism and social movements catalyzed by young people’s  
protests against the Vietnam War.142 The companies subject to this stunning 
expansion of the regulatory state appeared to have been caught by surprise, 
and they did not muster any effective opposition to the rapid-fire creation 
of these new institutions. They recovered quickly, however, and the seeds of 
centralized White House review controlled by political staff and economic 
advisers at the highest levels were planted in the early days of the Nixon 
administration when Maurice Stans, President Nixon’s Secretary of Com-
merce, persuaded chief domestic policy advisor John Ehrlichman to 
establish a taskforce to oversee EPA’s regulatory activities.143  
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That taskforce, the National Industrial Pollution Control Council 
(NIPCC), enthusiastically supported so-called “quality of life reviews”144 to 
curb EPA’s implementation of the Clean Air Act of 1970.145 Established by 
a 1970 executive order, NIPCC included sixty-three corporate executives 
who were appointed by the Commerce Department Secretary.146 The 
NIPCC’s purpose was to give potential regulatory targets an open line to 
the top levels of government. Although modern regulatory review does not 
incorporate such blatant efforts to involve business leaders as decision 
makers, one of the lasting legacies of these early efforts is an unduly solici-
tous cultivation of industry complaints and opposition to regulatory 
proposals spearheaded by OIRA, the “court of second resort” for such 
aggrieved parties.147 
From their inception, as Professor Robert Percival recounts, quality of 
life reviews followed a second pattern that remains entrenched in regulato-
ry review as practiced today: the inside game occurs simultaneously with 
the outside game.148 William Ruckelshaus, EPA’s first Administrator and, 
for the time, a committed environmentalist, pleaded his case for particular-
ly controversial rules to the press and to sympathetic members of Congress, 
including Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie, the presidential candidate 
who is largely credited with having provoked Nixon into creating EPA by 
executive order.149 This outside game was more than matched by regulated 
industries’ inside game: quality of life reviews behind closed doors where 
the outcomes of a rulemaking were negotiated by senior administration 
officials in close collaboration with the NIPCC. Ruckelshaus and his suc-
cessor, Russell Train, worked hard to put the best face on final EPA 
decisions that clearly reflected major substantive retreats forced upon them 
behind the scenes, arguing that OMB, by then the convener of such  
reviews, did not dictate these outcomes.150 These protests did not reassure 
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public interest groups, who accused OMB of allowing regulated industries 
to negate EPA’s best professional judgments.151  
And so it went throughout the 1970s. President Gerald Ford retained 
quality of life reviews, inspiring similar controversy on Capitol Hill and 
among public interest groups.152 Ford also mandated a precursor of cost-
benefit analysis in the form of a requirement that agencies prepare  
“inflation impact statements” to include discussion of the potential effect of 
the proposed regulation on industry costs and therefore inflation through-
out the economy as a whole.153 A new office within the White House, the 
Council on Wage and Price Stability, “was given the responsibility of coor-
dinating agency compliance” with this new requirement.154 The Council’s 
focus was on economic regulation, as opposed to health, safety, and envi-
ronmental rules.155 
Jimmy Carter’s inauguration as President in 1977 at first seemed to  
signal a new day for EPA and other health and safety agencies.156 The  
President did not officially repeal quality of life reviews, but the process 
withered on the vine as newly-appointed EPA administrator John Quarles 
announced that his staff would no longer participate in those delibera-
tions.157 But when Carter nominated his old friend Bert Lance to serve as 
OMB director, it rapidly became clear that a robust process of curbing 
strong regulatory proposals within the White House would continue.158 On 
March 23, 1978, President Carter issued the first executive order to man-
date a comprehensive regulatory review program headquartered at OMB.159 
Executive Order 12,044 directed that regulatory proposals should not im-
pose “unnecessary” burdens on the economy and should be issued only after 
consideration of “meaningful” alternatives.160 It also required the prepara-
tion of a “Regulatory Analysis” to accompany all rulemaking proposals and 
final rules, as well as a semiannual regulatory agenda containing notice of 
rules under development.161 
The most notable characteristic of the new review process was the addi-
tion of yet another unusually potent set of players to the process.  
In addition to the Council on Wage and Price Controls, the Council of 
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Economic Advisers, and OMB, the President set up an inter-agency group 
called the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), which included 
representatives of seventeen major federal agencies.162 RARG’s four-
member executive committee included representatives from the Council 
of Economic Advisers and OMB, as well as two rotating members of the 
larger agency group—one from an “economic agency” and one from a 
“regulatory agency.” The executive committee was instructed to select some 
twenty major regulations annually for intensive review.163  
This process triggered significant controversy despite the fact that  
it occurred in public and was supposedly designed to encourage the agen-
cies themselves to learn the new methodologies rather than have OMB do 
this work for them. Among other disputes, the RARG forced then-EPA 
Administrator Douglas Costle to weaken a crucial standard that would set 
the acceptable level of ozone (commonly known as smog) in the ambient 
air.164 As we shall see, the George W. Bush administration and the Obama 
administration saw reprises of this episode with the RARG’s successor, 
OIRA, in charge.165  
From a present-day perspective, however, the most significant feature 
of the Carter process was that the agencies assigned the mission of preserv-
ing environmental quality, eliminating workplace health and safety threats, 
or drumming defective products out of the marketplace took their place as 
members of a much larger group, with no special recognition of their statu-
tory mandates or their unique expertise. This aspect of regulatory review, 
which undermines any internal government deference Congress intended to 
assign to the protector agencies, is now a deeply entrenched and enormously 
powerful tool used by White House staff when conducting centralized 
review of individual rules. 
B. 1980–1992: Executive Orders and Paperwork Review 
At the close of the Carter administration, industry champions of  
deregulation succeeded in getting two statutes passed to impose further 
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controls on the agencies: the Regulatory Flexibility Act166 and the Paperwork 
Reduction Act.167 The second statute created OIRA. The new unit’s statu-
tory mission was limited to reviewing any proposal by a government agency 
or department to require the completion of additional paperwork by citi-
zens, state or local government, or private sector entities.168 But OIRA’s far 
more important role in reviewing the substance of regulations was soon 
fleshed out in a series of executive orders.169 The first, Executive Order 
12,291,170 issued by President Reagan within one month of taking office, had 
three distinct mandates: 
1. All covered agencies171 must refrain from taking action unless 
potential benefits outweigh potential costs.172 The agencies must 
also consider regulatory alternatives that involve the lowest net 
cost.173 
2. Agencies must prepare a “regulatory impact analysis” (RIA) 
containing their cost-benefit analysis for each “major” rule, de-
fined to include any proposal that would have an annual effect 
on the economy of $100 million or more.174 
3. Agencies must send a copy of each proposed and final rule to 
OIRA before it is published in the Federal Register.175 Agencies 
were instructed to refrain from publishing rules until they had 
responded to any concerns raised by OIRA staff.176 
Agencies were required to forward proposed and final rules, along with 
accompanying RIAs, to OIRA at least sixty days prior to their publica-
tion.177 OIRA would be “deemed to have concluded review” within thirty 
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days of submission of a major final rule or rule proposal unless “the Director 
advises the agency to the contrary,” in essence giving OIRA discretion to 
extend its review period indefinitely.178 
In addition to formalizing cost-benefit analysis—notably, without any 
statutory authority—Executive Order 12,291 is significant because of the 
dynamic it set up between agency heads and the OIRA Administrator. The 
order did not go so far as to hand OIRA the power to kill a rule outright, 
an outcome that arguably would be illegal under EPA’s authorizing statutes, 
which delegate rulemaking mandates directly to the agency Administrator 
as opposed to the President.179 But given the White House’s sway over 
agency heads, that explicit grant of final authority was unnecessary. Instead, 
the instruction to consult—and implicitly to satisfy—OIRA’s economists 
set up an inside game dynamic reminiscent of the NIPCC and now quite 
entrenched: all disputes would be negotiated behind closed doors at the 
staff level, no matter how difficult the dispute and how garbled the result-
ing compromise.  
President Reagan’s second and last executive order on regulatory  
review, Executive Order 12,498, extended OIRA’s power further by requir-
ing covered agencies to submit entire regulatory programs to OIRA on an 
annual basis, specifying that OIRA had the authority to “return” individual 
rulemaking proposals to an agency for “reconsideration” if the item had not 
been included or was “materially different” from what the annual agenda 
described.180 This development in effect ratified the idea that OIRA was 
not merely a passive recipient of whatever ideas the agencies chose to  
advance, but instead had some responsibility for reviewing the wisdom of 
their overall regulatory priorities.  
Reagan’s expansion of OIRA’s authority and intrusiveness generated 
controversy in the press and on Capitol Hill. Congress included many 
strong advocates of environmental and other health and safety protections, 
including Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and James Florio  
(D-NJ), both of whom were instrumental in conducting rigorous and unre-
lenting oversight of OIRA’s activities.181 In 1983, Congress allowed the 
appropriation for OIRA’s regulatory review activities to expire, but the unit 
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continued to receive funding for its work under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act through its mother institution, OMB.182 OIRA was reauthorized in 
1986 by a law that made its director subject to Senate confirmation, thereby 
giving Congress leverage over its leadership, at least initially.183 But, per-
haps most remarkably, in 1985 five House committee chairmen filed a 
friend-of-the-court brief supporting a lawsuit brought by the Public Citizen 
Litigation Group against OSHA, which had refused to regulate ethylene 
oxide in the workplace, reportedly at OIRA’s behest.184 Members of Congress 
very rarely participate in judicial proceedings, making this episode a telling 
expression of their restlessness over OIRA’s deregulatory efforts in a decid-
edly divided government.  
As Reagan’s Vice President, George H.W. Bush served as the chair of a 
cabinet-level “Task Force on Regulatory Relief,” a self-styled forum of last 
resort for industries that could not convince agencies to acquiesce to their 
demands.185 The Task Force assembled a “hit list” of suspect regulations 
nominated by industry.186 When he became President, the elder Bush toned 
down his position, at least with respect to natural resource issues, declaring 
himself the “environmental president” and supporting passage of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments, the most ambitious environmental statute ever 
passed.187 His overall record as President was a moderate one, partially 
eclipsing his role as deregulatory point person.188  
Professor Percival notes that the elder President Bush once exclaimed 
that he could not understand why he could not simply mandate that agen-
cies act in a certain way, despite their detailed statutory mandates, having 
them “salute smartly and go execute whatever decision I make.”189 Despite 
this confusion about the scope of presidential authority when Congress has 
conferred non-discretionary mandates on agencies, his presidency is not 
known for using OIRA to aggressively monitor and change industry 
behavior. 
C. 1992–2000: “Collegial” Review 
The election of William Jefferson Clinton assuaged congressional 
Democrats’ fears about OIRA’s influence on health, safety, and environmental 
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regulation to some extent, and, to reassure these critics, the new admin-
istration wasted no time putting its own stamp on the process, issuing 
Executive Order 12,866 to replace 12,291 and 12,498 in September 1993.190 
Although the Clinton approach preserved OIRA’s authority to consult 
with respect to “significant” rules (those that would impose economic 
effects over $100 million annually or “adversely affect” the economy “in a 
material way”), it imposed some important constraints on the process.191 
OIRA was given a series of mandatory deadlines for the conclusion of 
review, with the review period limited to ninety days following submis-
sion of the rule by an agency or department, although that deadline was 
subject to one possible extension of thirty days if the extension was  
approved in writing by the OIRA Administrator and the head of the agency 
responsible for the rule requested the extension.192 As significantly, Execu-
tive Order 12,866 required that after a regulatory action was published in 
the Federal Register, or after an agency or department had announced its 
decision not to pursue the regulatory action, OIRA “shall make available to 
the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency during 
the review by OIRA under this section.”193 These before-and-after docu-
ments would reveal the extent and nature of the changes OIRA demanded 
from the agencies. Last but not least, although the Clinton order required 
agencies to conduct, and OIRA to review, cost-benefit analyses, the ultimate 
standard for acceptance of a rule was whether benefits “justified” costs, a 
formula perceived as significantly more flexible than the Reagan require-
ment that benefits “outweigh” costs.194 These reforms were useful, but they 
did not eliminate OIRA’s gatekeeper authority.  
President Clinton continued the use of cost-benefit analysis in order to 
demonstrate his commitment to reining in “big government,” thereby shor-
ing up his credentials as a new and different type of Democrat.195 During 
the Clinton administration, OIRA’s intervention in rulemaking was less 
aggressive and destructive than before. For example, the number of rules 
reviewed by OIRA dropped precipitously from an average of 2,400 annual-
ly under the Reagan and Bush executive orders to an annual average of 615 
during President Clinton’s two terms.196 But the infrastructure remained 
available for a resurgence of a far more intrusive strain of centralized 
review. Clinton legitimized this structure, doing as much to establish 
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OIRA’s hegemony as arbiter of health, safety, and environmental policy as 
the concerted efforts of the preceding twelve years of Republican presiden-
cies. 
Because previous critiques of centralized regulatory review were 
fundamentally partisan—that is, liberal Democrats blaming conservative 
Republicans for hostility to a proactive regulatory state—the decision by 
the moderate, Democratic Clinton administration to maintain cost-benefit 
analysis driven regulatory review at the White House radically changed the 
debate. At the moment Executive Order 12,866 was signed, advocates of 
the agencies’ active and unimpeded pursuit of their core missions were 
transformed into outliers existing on the left fringe of the mainstream 
political parties. Cost-benefit analysis was embraced on a bipartisan basis. 
The most diehard opponents of a robust regulatory state—including self-
interested industries and traditional conservatives opposed to the expansion 
of government—had a home at the center of both parties. And the agencies 
were pushed into eight more years of learning to justify their judgments 
through the prism of market failure: only if the market would not correct 
the harm caused to people or natural resources could regulatory controls be 
justified. 
In retrospect, what is most surprising about this turn of events is that a 
robust and talented cadre of critics of cost-benefit analysis persisted in 
attacking this methodology, even as OIRA’s role as the court of last resort 
for regulatory opponents became established as an institutional fixture of 
regulatory affairs.197 But by the end of the George W. Bush administration, 
the details of cost-benefit methodology were far less important than the use 
of OIRA as the forum-of-choice for regulatory review, realizing the goals of 
Nixon’s early quality of life reviews to an extent that the originators of that 
process could not have imagined. 
D. 2000–2009: Gatekeeper with Teeth 
George W. Bush took office without acknowledging the political con-
straints imposed by an extremely close election and was determined to push 
government policies far to the right. In the regulatory arena, Vice President 
Richard Cheney rapidly established an atmosphere modeled on the earlier 
Reagan campaign to sharply curb health, safety, and environmental  
regulation.198 John Graham, a well-known and enthusiastic practitioner of 
cost-benefit analysis, became the OIRA Administrator for the first five 
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years of the administration’s two terms.199 In a stroke of political brilliance, 
the new President retained Executive Order 12,866, throwing his oppo-
nents off balance, at least initially, by claiming that he was not changing the 
regulatory review policies embraced by the more liberal Clinton admin-
istration. A reasonable guess is that Graham advised the President that the 
infrastructure created by the Clinton order was flexible enough to permit 
an enthusiastic revival of OIRA’s interference in agency rulemaking. In 
October 2002, Graham said:  
[T]he changes we are making at OMB in pursuit of smarter regula-
tion are not headline grabbers: No far-reaching legislative 
initiatives, no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns of 
regulatory relief. Yet we are making some changes that we believe 
will have a long-lasting impact on the regulatory state.200 
Curtis Copeland, the Congressional Research Service’s veteran expert on 
regulatory review, explains that OIRA returned to a “gatekeeper role,” 
noting that Graham defined his mission as “protect[ing] people from poorly 
designed rules.”201 Graham’s tenure, as well as the two years served by his 
successor, Susan Dudley, were defined by a sharp increase in the use of 
“return letters” asking agencies to rethink regulatory proposals and by a 
determined re-emphasis on economic analysis as the fulcrum for deciding 
whether rules should live or die.202 
Graham also revised OIRA’s guidance to agencies on how to conduct 
cost-benefit analysis, imposing, among other requirements, stricter rules 
regarding the “discounting” of regulatory benefits for rules that would have 
a beneficial effect on future generations.203 Discounting refers to the prac-
tice of treating a monetized benefit or cost as an investment, with money 
transferred today worth more than money transferred five years from now. 
The rationale for discounting is to ensure that a future benefit—for example, 
a life saved in the fifth year after a regulation goes into effect—is worth 
only the amount of money that would need to be invested today to accrue 
the value of that life over the same period, using rates that track long-term 
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return rates estimated by the Department of Treasury. The Clinton guid-
ance gave agencies discretion on which discount rate to use, while the Bush 
guidance instructed them to calculate benefits using both a seven and a 
three percent rate, even in instances where regulatory interventions would 
achieve benefits far in the future.204 Longer-term discounting is an especially 
salient issue today because of the so-called “intergenerational equity” prob-
lems caused by climate change. If benefits for our children’s children occur 
in fifty years, and a relatively high discount rate is used, the monetary value 
of those benefits in present-day money dwindles to almost nothing.205 
Graham’s OIRA justified this outcome as follows: 
Some believe . . . that it is ethically impermissible to discount the 
utility of future generations. That is, government should treat all 
generations equally. Even under this approach, it would still be 
correct to discount future costs and consumption benefits generally 
(perhaps at a lower rate than for intragenerational analysis), due to 
the expectation that future generations will be wealthier and thus 
will value a marginal dollar of benefits or costs by less than those 
alive today.206 
In other words, OIRA under Graham took the position that it does not 
matter if discounting eliminates projections of any benefits for future gen-
erations because Americans will be increasingly wealthy and able to afford 
to remedy the environmental degradation past generations have left behind. 
The Obama administration has left these instructions in place. Meanwhile, 
polling conducted in 2006 and again in 2010 demonstrates that a majority 
of Americans worry constantly about their children’s future quality of life, 
fearing it will be decidedly less positive than life now.207 
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The other important innovation of the Graham/Dudley era was OIRA’s 
energetic assertion of jurisdiction over science policy. Graham realized that 
the source of many, if not most, of the rules he disliked arose from deci-
sions made to invoke the “precautionary principle”—that is, the theory that 
government cannot afford to wait until an airtight scientific case documents 
the link between toxic chemical exposure and irreversible adverse health 
effects. The precautionary principle is the backbone of every significant 
American statute that controls toxic exposures because all those laws in-
struct agencies to prevent harm, rather than waiting for it to materialize.208 
Indeed, the most compelling statement of the principle as it is embodied in 
American law was made by Judge James Skelly Wright in upholding EPA’s 
first significant regulatory decision—the elimination of lead from gasoline: 
Man’s ability to alter his environment has developed far more rap-
idly than his ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his 
alterations. It is only recently that we have begun to appreciate the 
danger posed by unregulated modification of the world around us, 
and have created watchdog agencies whose task it is to warn us, and 
protect us . . . . [U]nequipped with crystal balls and unable to read 
the future, [these agencies] are nonetheless charged with evaluating 
the effects of unprecedented environmental modifications, often 
made on a massive scale. Necessarily, they must deal with predic-
tions and uncertainty, with developing evidence, with conflicting 
evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at all.209 
Not satisfied with merely using cost-benefit analysis to combat precaution 
as his predecessors had done, Graham mounted two forays designed to 
change the fundamental risk assessment practices used by the agencies, 
especially EPA. The first involved peer review of scientific studies.210 
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Graham’s approach would have made it much more difficult for agencies to 
include federally funded researchers on such panels because they were 
suspected of harboring pro-regulation biases.211 The second, even more 
ambitious proposal focused on how agencies assess the risks posed by toxic 
chemical exposures, insisting that they consider the overall harm that could 
be suffered by the general population rather than focusing on the more 
elevated and alarming risks to vulnerable populations (for example, chil-
dren, those living with AIDS, or the elderly).212 Fortunately, both proposals 
were defeated by a combination of public interest group advocacy and 
opposition from scientific bodies such as the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science and the National Research Council.213 
To his credit, Graham made some significant strides in increasing the 
transparency of OIRA’s activities, posting notices of meetings with outside 
parties and making return letters available on its website.214 But OIRA did 
not fulfill—and still has not fulfilled—the most important transparency 
mandate established by Executive Order 12,866: publicly disclosing the 
regulatory proposals sent to OIRA by agencies and the edited versions of 
those documents following OIRA’s review. 
Despite the success of the stratagem that preserved Clinton’s Executive 
Order 12,866, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,422 at the tail end 
of his administration, 215 likely in an effort to further entrench OIRA’s 
power in case a Democrat was elected President. The new order made 
several changes in regulatory review, including requirements that (1) agen-
cies identify the “market failure” that justifies a regulation (thereby 
implying that without one, they had no authority to control industrial 
activities); (2) agencies estimate cumulative regulatory costs and benefits of 
rules they expect to publish over the next year; and (3) OIRA review ex-
tend to “significant guidance documents.”216 This development triggered 
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another round of criticism that OIRA was overreaching by further expanding 
its influence over the daily activities of the agencies.217 
One of the most notable events in OIRA’s bureaucratic history occurred 
in the last weeks of George W. Bush’s second term, when a heated confron-
tation between Susan Dudley (John Graham’s successor) and Marcus 
Peacock (the number two political appointee at EPA) became public.218 
Dudley and Peacock were fighting over an effort to lower the “secondary” 
standard for ozone pollution that affects crops and plants.219 EPA had  
undertaken a long proceeding that included extensive consultations with its 
statutorily created Clean Air Act Science Advisory Committee (CASAC), 
and had already disappointed the scientists in setting the “primary” ozone 
NAAQS to the extent that the Committee sent an extraordinarily strong 
letter to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson, warning him, “[I]t is the 
Committee’s consensus scientific opinion that your decision to set the 
primary ozone standard above this [0.060 to 0.070 parts per million] range 
fails to satisfy the explicit stipulations of the Clean Air Act that you ensure 
an adequate margin of safety for all individuals, including sensitive popula-
tions.”220 A week before EPA planned to release its final decision on both 
the primary and secondary NAAQS, Dudley wrote EPA Administrator 
Stephen Johnson a memorandum explaining that she disagreed with the 
standard.221 She argued that EPA should have considered economic values 
in setting the standard.222 Peacock responded on behalf of the agency that 
cost was not a legally permissible criterion under the specific section of the 
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Clean Air Act at stake in the decision.223 Although the details of how the 
final decision was made have not surfaced, OIRA’s position prevailed, 
putting the administration in the position of endorsing the view that costs 
could be considered in establishing NAAQS.224 Recognizing this reality, 
Johnson suggested when he announced the revised standard that Congress 
needed to consider changing the statute to allow future administrators to 
consider costs.225 Dr. Rogene Henderson, Chair of CASAC, testified before 
Congress that, as a result of OIRA’s interference, “[w]ilful [sic] ignorance 
triumphed over sound science.”226  
One other lesson from the ozone confrontation worth emphasizing is 
that OIRA assumed negative economic effects of the stricter ozone stand-
ard, but did not cite a cost-benefit analysis in staking out its position. This 
omission suggests that while such analyses consume significant time and 
resources, they may not always be the determinative factor in high-profile 
regulatory decisions. Another example of this phenomenon is the George 
W. Bush administration’s decision to use a lax, market-based “cap and 
trade” approach to controlling mercury emissions from power plants.227 The 
cost-benefit analysis ultimately compiled to justify the rule, which would 
have not gone into effect until 2018 and was supported avidly by electric 
utilities, demonstrated that costs exceeded benefits by as much as 448 to 1. 
Nevertheless, OIRA, supposedly the enforcer of the principle that benefits 
must exceed costs, cleared the way for the final rule, with a Federal Register 
notice that admitted: 
Using these alternate discount rates, the social costs of the final rule 
are estimated to be approximately $848 million in 2020 when as-
suming a 3 percent discount rate. These costs become $896 million 
in 2020 if one assumes a 7 percent discount rate. . . . As is dis-
cussed above, the total social benefits that EPA was able to monetize in 
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the RIA total $0.4 million to $3.0 million using a 3 percent discount 
rate, and $0.2 million to $2.0 million using a 7 percent discount rate.228 
A coalition of environmental groups and states that planned to enact their 
own, far more stringent mercury standards ultimately persuaded the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to overturn the rule, 
and the Obama administration is now reconsidering it.229 
E. 2009–Present 
1. Business as Usual 
By the time Cass Sunstein, a former Harvard Law School professor 
with a lengthy, eclectic, and provocative publication record, was confirmed 
as OIRA Administrator in September 2009,230 troubling signs of acute 
regulatory failure were present for all to see. This Article focuses on failures 
in the arena of programs to protect public health, worker safety, and the 
environment. But what may turn out to be the seminal event for the 
Obama administration’s historical legacy is the failure of the regulatory 
system designed to police investment practices, which in turn triggered a 
worldwide economic recession.231 Neither the President nor Sunstein have 
ever publicly associated the identical causes of the two sets of problems: 
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namely, hollow (or underfunded) government, weak laws, and the collapse 
of an aggressive enforcement culture.232  
Sunstein was a friend of the President when both taught at the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School and an early participant in the Obama 
campaign.233 Although his own scholarship has extended significantly 
beyond regulatory policy to encompass constitutional interpretation and 
civil rights,234 Sunstein’s positions on regulatory issues are consistently 
critical of the precautionary principle and supportive of strict cost-benefit 
analysis.235 His nomination sent the message that even as the new President 
appointed aggressive agency heads like EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, 
his administration would continue centralized White House review as the 
ultimate arbiter of regulatory policy.  
Somewhere between thirty-five and forty OIRA “desk officers” and 
“branch chiefs” review approximately seven hundred regulatory matters 
annually.236 The disparities between OIRA’s scant resources and the more 
ample, but still inadequate, resources of the health, safety, and environ-
mental agencies make high-profile assertions of its prerogatives essential. If 
OIRA tried to scrutinize each rule that comes to it for review with any 
level of intensity, it would soon sink beneath the waves of an impossible 
workload. Instead, it singles out a handful of rules for special attention, 
engaging in a kind of deterrence-based oversight that gives agencies strong 
incentives to anticipate OIRA’s objections before they even send a rule over 
for review. 
Sunstein’s ambition when he was first nominated in January 2009 was 
to issue a new executive order revamping 12,866 in order to introduce ideas 
developed under the rubric of “behavioral economics,” a long-time passion 
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in his academic writing,237 and President Obama issued a memorandum 
directing OIRA to undertake such revisions.238 In an unprecedented move, 
the White House opened this project to public comment, ultimately receiv-
ing 183 separate documents, primarily from industry interest groups.239 But 
the process did not produce a new order. Instead, months after the deadline 
stated in the President’s memorandum, Sunstein acknowledged that he 
would proceed with regulatory review under Executive Order 12,866, the 
process in effect under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.240 
The track record of OIRA under President Obama is significantly 
more controversial than its performance under President Clinton, but 
somewhat less contentious than its performance under President George 
W. Bush. Unlike Graham, Sunstein has not attempted to issue broad policy 
statements on sensitive subjects like risk assessment. Yet his OIRA has 
proved quite intrusive in agency decision making and he has openly boasted 
about the administration’s determination to curb allegedly excessive regula-
tion.241 Critics have emphasized Sunstein’s penchant for derailing or 
curbing proposals to strengthen protections for workers and the environ-
ment.242 
The two most salient examples of the long-term implications of Sun-
stein’s efforts to craft regulatory policy are OIRA’s suppression of EPA’s 
latest efforts to tighten the NAAQS for ozone and its treatment of EPA’s 
proposed coal ash rule. OIRA could not have achieved either result without 
the support of the President—explicit in the case of ozone and tacit in the 
case of coal ash. But in a regulatory system that depends on highly detailed 
statutory mandates to agencies like EPA, the politicization of the rulemak-
ing process through OIRA cannot be dismissed by the facile conclusion 
that the involvement of the President justifies such outcomes. 
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2. Ozone Reversal  
On September 2, 2011, the Friday morning before a long Labor Day 
weekend, President Obama issued a statement announcing that he had 
instructed EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to suspend efforts to update the 
NAAQS for ozone.243 According to the return letter Sunstein sent to Jackson, 
the President’s decision was based on his concern about the “uncertainty” 
that tougher standards would pose for regulated industries: 
Under the Act, finalizing a new standard now is not mandatory and 
could produce needless uncertainty. The Act explicitly sets out a 
five-year cycle for review of national ambient air quality standards. 
The current cycle began in 2008, and EPA shall be compelled to 
revisit the most recent ozone standards again in 2013. . . . [I]ssuing 
a final rule in late 2011 would be problematic in view of the fact 
that a new assessment, and potentially new standards, will be de-
veloped in the relatively near future.244 
The background to this episode of déjà vu over ozone is that in September 
2009, Jackson had asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of  
Columbia Circuit to suspend a lawsuit brought by environmentalists to 
challenge the George W. Bush-era ozone standards, stating that she was 
withdrawing them in order to initiate a rulemaking that would develop 
significantly more stringent limits.245 But the agency kept delaying this 
proceeding, signaling the outbreak of another political tug-of-war at the 
White House.246  
Because Jackson had suspended what she had labeled a “legally indefen-
sible”247 standard, the President’s decision to order her to stand down until 
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 247. Gabriel Nelson, Bush Ozone Standards Are ‘Not Legally Defensible’—EPA Chief, N.Y. 
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at least 2013 appeared to have left in place a 1997 standard that is substan-
tially weaker than even the Bush-era one.248 However, Jackson subsequently 
announced that she was reinstating the Bush standard she had earlier 
disdained.249 The Bush standard was 0.075 parts per million (ppm) in the 
ambient air, while the Obama administration had proposed lowering that 
number to between 0.060 ppm and 0.070 ppm; the 1997 standard Bush 
sought to replace was 0.08 ppm.250 According to EPA estimates, lowering 
the standard to 0.060 ppm would avoid 4,000 to 12,000 premature deaths, 
21,000 hospital and emergency room visits, 111,000 upper and lower respir-
atory symptoms, 58,000 cases of aggravated asthma, 2.5 million days when 
individual people miss work or school, and 8.1 million days when individual 
people must restrict their work or other activities, generating total, mone-
tized benefits in the range of $35 billion to $100 billion annually.251 (These 
large ranges reflect the difficulty of quantifying future benefits that afflicts 
all such analyses.)  
Again, the Clean Air Act requires EPA to reconsider its NAAQS every 
five years, consulting with a statutorily created scientific advisory board 
before setting the final number.252 Frustrated by the Obama administra-
tion’s repeated delays, environmentalists and the governments of thirteen 
states had already announced in August 2011 that they would ask the D.C. 
Circuit to reinstate their lawsuit against the Bush-era standard,253 and they 
appear to have a very good chance of success, given the science advisory 
board’s unanimous advice that EPA revise it to a significantly lower num-
ber.254  
The prospect of a federal appellate court ordering EPA to ignore the 
President’s order underscores the cynicism of White House interference. 
This distasteful impression is underscored by the fact that even had Jackson 
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 254. See supra notes 220, 226 and accompanying text. 
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been allowed to promulgate the more stringent standard, implementation 
efforts—and therefore the expenditure of private sector compliance 
costs—would not have gotten underway for several more years, making 
the President’s invocation of the present economic recession that much 
more embarrassing.255 
But perhaps the most enduring implication of OIRA’s role in justifying 
the ozone delay is the peculiar rationale that regulatory uncertainty justifies 
postponing statutorily mandated decisions to tighten controls on pollutants. 
In fact, OIRA had set the stage for this outcome by crafting the new 
Executive Order, 13,563, signed by the President on January 21, 2011.256 The 
order is most notable for its requirement that agencies undertake “retro-
spective analyses of existing rules,” an activity designed to placate 
increasingly harsh criticism of the regulatory system by House Republi-
cans.257 But it apparently had much greater significance for OIRA 
Administrator Sunstein, who cited it in his return letter to EPA Adminis-
trator Jackson, noting that Executive Order 13,563 “emphasizes that our 
regulatory system ‘must promote predictability and reduce uncertainty’” 
and asserting that “the President has directed me to continue to work closely 
with all executive agencies and departments to implement Executive Order 
13,563 and to minimize regulatory costs and burdens, particularly in this 
economically challenging time.”258 In effect, this elastic and potentially 
infinite grant of discretion to the President, as represented by OIRA, could 
justify the suspension of any rulemaking, whether or not any direct, factual 
link is established between the regulatory proposal and difficulties in 
achieving an economic recovery. As Professor Daniel Farber has noted, 
“there’s so much wrong with the ‘uncertainty’ argument that it’s hard to 
know where to begin,” including the fact that “unemployment is currently 
lowest in health care, extractive industries and the financial sector—exactly 
the areas where there has been the most regulatory effort.”259 
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3. The Coal Ash Proposal  
As for EPA’s coal ash rule, OIRA delayed the proposal for seven 
months—well beyond the allotted ninety-day review period under Execu-
tive Order 12,866—while it rewrote both the rulemaking notice and the 
regulatory impact statement drafted by EPA.260 Given the prominence of 
the rule, the episode reinforced the strong impression left by Sunstein’s 
appointment that the transition from the George W. Bush administration 
to the Obama administration did not mark a significant change in the most 
important outcomes of centralized regulatory review of individual rules. 
In response to the one-billion-gallon coal ash spill in Kingston, Tennes-
see, EPA decided that federal regulation would be necessary to eliminate 
those hazards, forwarding a proposed rule to OIRA in October 2009. That 
document, referred to here as the “Initial EPA Proposal,” would have regu-
lated coal ash as a hazardous waste, emphasizing two justifications for 
ramping up disposal controls: (1) the migration of toxic constituents of the 
ash into the environment, especially groundwater, and (2) the recurrence of 
spills like the one in Kingston.261 
Regulating coal ash destined for land disposal as a “hazardous waste” 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)262 will change 
industry practices in three ways. First, the operators of coal-fired power 
plants would be compelled to send the ash to landfills and surface  
impoundments that comply with more protective design requirements, 
including the installation of liners, impermeable (rain-proof) covers, and 
leachate detection systems. Second, EPA would craft those design stand-
ards, although state regulators would remain responsible for enforcing 
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individual facility permits in most places. Finally, federal or state regulators 
would supervise the closure of coal ash dump sites that no longer qualify 
for disposal because they lack these protective features.263 
EPA estimates that approximately 495 electric plants generated 136 
million tons of ash in 2008.264 Utilities disposed of about 34% (46 million 
tons) in so-called “dry” landfills that cover deposits so that rainfall cannot 
infiltrate them; around 22% (29.4 million tons) went into surface impound-
ments like the one at Kingston; some 37% (50.1 million tons) was 
“beneficially reused”; and nearly 8% went into the shafts of abandoned coal 
mines.265  
The “beneficial” reuses that consume 50.1 million tons of coal ash  
annually include everything from applying the ash to agriculture lands, 
using it in concrete, placing it in road beds before concrete is poured, and 
using it as a filler material for wall board.266 In theory at least, recycling 
practices that reuse coal ash safely have significant social benefits, not only 
because they avoid disposal of the waste in dumpsites that could leak or 
collapse, but because they make unnecessary the consumption of virgin 
materials that require expensive processing before they are used. Unfortu-
nately, EPA has not yet reached the question of what kinds of recycling 
options are truly “beneficial” for human health and the environment.  
Instead, the agency has sidestepped this question in both its initial proposal 
and in the proposal that emerged from OIRA’s review by deciding that 
whenever a utility claims to be reusing coal ash, such practices would be 
exempt from any further regulation under RCRA.267 
In May 2010, a fundamentally changed proposal emerged from OIRA. 
Rather than sticking with a single proposal, the rulemaking notice advanced 
three alternatives: (1) adopting EPA’s original option that coal ash be regu-
lated as a RCRA Subtitle C hazardous waste;268 (2) shifting back to an 
approach that would treat coal ash as a “solid” waste under RCRA Subtitle 
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D269 when it is disposed on land, essentially leaving all regulatory decisions 
and enforcement to state discretion; and (3) implementing a so-called “D 
prime” option that would allow all existing coal ash disposal landfills and 
surface impoundments to continue to function without change for the 
remainder of their useful life.270 This transformation of a strongly protec-
tive proposal into an equivocal offering of alternatives, two of which would 
not significantly alter the status quo, offers a disturbing picture of how 
OIRA operates on both procedural and substantive grounds. The coal ash 
episode, which remains unresolved, demonstrates a review process and an 
institution that has not changed either its orientation or outcomes during 
the four decades of its existence. 
Procedural Issues: Dominance by Industry and Hostile “Sister” 
Agencies 
Although the original EPA coal ash proposal was never made public (as 
far as I can tell),271 rumors about its content generated an intense industry 
lobbying campaign before OIRA. The OIRA staff sat through forty-seven 
separate meetings with organizational representatives interested in the EPA 
proposal.272 Approximately two-thirds of these meetings were with industry 
and state representatives opposing the rule and one-third were with repre-
sentatives of environmental groups supporting the rule.273 The meetings 
amounted to thirty percent of the 142 meetings that OIRA had held since the 
advent of the Obama administration, an astonishing percentage because 
OIRA is responsible for reviewing all the proposed and final rules generated 
by the vast majority of federal agencies and departments.274  
The claim that this elaborate, OIRA-run process enhances the fairness 
of rulemaking is contradicted by the reality that it benefits industrial enti-
ties that can afford to field a large cadre of legal and technical experts and 
lobbyists. A study I conducted with colleagues at the Center for Progressive 
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Reform (CPR) examined each of the 6,194 separate OIRA “reviews” of 
regulatory proposals and final rules between October 16, 2001, when it first 
began to post notices of meetings held with outside parties on the internet, 
and June 1, 2011, when we ended our research.275 During this roughly ten-
year period, OIRA officials met 1,080 times with 5,759 participants.276 Our 
analysis showed that 65% of the attendees at these meetings represented 
industry, about five times the number of people who appeared on behalf of 
public interest groups.277 A surprising 442 of the 1,080 meetings involved 
regulatory matters that originated at EPA even though the agency accounted 
for only 11% of the matters reviewed by OIRA.278 According to its own 
internal figures, OIRA changed 84% of the rules forwarded by EPA, in 
comparison to a 65% change rate for other agencies.279 
Controversial rulemaking proposals often generate wide participation 
throughout the White House. For example, research by Professors Lisa 
Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh found that as many as nineteen offices 
became involved in OIRA’s reviews during the George H. W. Bush and 
Clinton administrations.280 For reasons that are unclear, rather than asking 
the agencies to submit their own individual comments on a rulemaking, 
OIRA has taken upon itself the job of holding the pen in these disputes, 
drafting a set of “inter-agency comments” that are forwarded to the rulemaking 
agency. At least in theory, a balanced set of comments from other agencies 
and departments, some favoring strong environmental protections and others 
opposing it, is consistent with the notice and comment structure established 
by the Administrative Procedure Act.281 But in direct contravention of the 
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instructions contained in Executive Order 12,866,282 OIRA follows a strict 
policy of keeping inter-agency comments confidential. Indeed, release of 
inter-agency comments in the coal ash rulemaking occurred only because 
EPA decided on its own to post them on the web, immediately triggering a 
behind-closed-doors dispute within the Obama administration. The com-
ments were briefly removed from the site, then rapidly re-posted within a 
few hours, accompanied by the following notice: 
The below document was posted on this public site in error by 
EPA. Interagency comments on draft rules by federal agencies un-
der Executive Order 12866 remain confidential to protect the 
integrity of the deliberative process. Because this document was 
inadvertently disclosed, EPA has decided, in this instance and with 
the agreement of the agencies, to allow the document to remain in 
the docket.283 
One additional reality underscores the negative implications of OIRA’s 
approach to inter-agency comments. Because Congress has decreed that all 
of the major pollution control statutes apply equally to entities operated by 
the United States,284 EPA’s proposals often affect the activities and budget 
expenditures of federal actors.285 Giving federal agencies and departments 
an inside, confidential track on influencing rulemakings creates a funda-
mental conflict of interest.  
This troubling state of affairs was on full display during the coal ash 
rulemaking. The Tennessee Valley Authority, the federal power company 
responsible for the Kingston spill, was treated as a confidential federal 
partner by OIRA, as were the Department of Transportation, a builder of 
highways using recycled coal ash, and the Department of Energy, which is 
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often allied with electric utilities.286 In the end, federal opponents of the 
coal ash proposal took on the features of a posse in a classic western, riding 
to support the OIRA sheriff’s pursuit of the outlaw EPA. 
Substantive Issues: The Stigma Effect 
When EPA sent its draft rulemaking proposal to OIRA for review, the 
documentation included a Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (Draft RIA) 
totaling about 165 pages;287 by the time the proposal emerged, this analysis 
had grown to 242 pages and predicted that the negative benefits of EPA’s 
preferred option could outweigh its positive social value by hundreds of 
billions of dollars.288 The central methodology introduced to produce this 
dramatic set of numbers is a peculiar application of behavioral economics.  
Industry opponents argue that the strong EPA Subtitle C proposal 
would create a “stigma effect” that would ruin the recycling market because 
consumers of the recycled ash would be too frightened to keep buying the 
material if it would be treated as hazardous when it was not recycled but 
instead dumped into a pit in the ground.289 This fear would be inspired by 
the possible threat of a lawsuit at some point in the future when, for exam-
ple, someone discovered that coal ash had been laid in the foundation of  
a highway, mixed with concrete, or used as filler in wallboard. Because 
industry representatives definitely do not concede that coal ash is in fact 
hazardous to public health or the environment, this anticipated litigation 
presumably would fail when plaintiffs could not prove that the ash had 
caused them any harm. Regardless, the fear itself would be enough to  
destroy the beneficial reuse market even if no lawsuit was ever won.290 
Consequently, electric utilities would incur two new expenses: the fees 
imposed for significantly more expensive disposal alternatives and the costs 
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of virgin materials needed to replace the coal ash that was previously used 
in such applications.291 OIRA’s quantification of these hypothetical costs in 
the Final Draft RIA ran to $233.5 billion in negative, or lost, economic and 
environmental benefits at the high end of a range of estimates.292 The 
OIRA economists assumed that if the strict EPA rule went into effect, 
approximately fifty-one percent of coal ash that is now recycled—some 37 
million tons—would be diverted to disposal in 2012, growing to about 41 
million tons annually by 2061.293 The assumption that the stigma effect 
would reduce the total amount of beneficial use by fifty percent was a “rea-
sonable approximation in the absense [sic] of information to the 
contrary”294—or, in other words, the number is based on an assumption 
that cannot be disproved. 
The Final Draft RIA admits that academic studies of stigma rarely 
produce such dramatic effects but does not cite examples of such research.295 
Curious about the absence of citations, I traced the concept back to the 
behavioral science literature,296 which includes a series of interesting studies 
that define stigma as people’s revulsion against substances or practices that 
could prove harmful to their health.297 In one famous experiment, research 
subjects were asked to drink juice after a “sterilized” cockroach had been 
dipped in the filled glass; most refused all such requests.298 Behavioral 
scientists have also studied reactions to polychlorinated biphenyls in milk, 
the ramifications of mad cow disease for the British beef industry, and the 
impact of the 1982 Tylenol tampering incident on future sales, all provid-
ing similar results: the average person exhibits revulsion over the 
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contamination and is anxious to avoid exposure.299 What is interesting and 
important about this literature, though, are the conclusions the researchers 
reach about the best solutions to stigma. They recommend confronting the 
threat with public education, efforts to restore trust in government, and—
ultimately—more protective regulation.300 In other words, the behavioral 
science  
literature—as opposed to the behavioral economics literature—focuses on 
average consumers’ response to risks beyond their control, as opposed to 
sophisticated industry executives’ feigned reactions to risks that are well 
within their control.  
The coal ash proposal marks the first time that an industry’s fear of 
liability is not only quantified but central to the formulation of an envi-
ronmental rulemaking proposal.301 Should OIRA continue this effort to 
apply behavioral economics more widely, the inevitable result will be 
weaker—and fewer—rules. 
EPA’s comment period on its coal ash proposal closed on November 19, 
2010. The agency is now in the throes of analyzing the thousands of pages 
of information, complaints, opinions, objections, exhortations, and threats 
of dire consequences that pack its Internet-based docket.302 Even if EPA 
decides to stay the course and support its original proposal, it must endure 
another round of OIRA’s scrutiny. And it must overcome the use of behav-
ioral economics to produce a crunching of numbers that heavily skews the 
outcome of the rulemaking toward the weaker regulatory alternatives. EPA 
Administrator Jackson told a House of Representatives appropriations 
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subcommittee that the agency will not issue a final rule regulating coal ash 
in 2011.303 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRALIZED REVIEW 
A. One-way Ratchet 
The forty-year history of centralized White House regulatory review—
from its genesis in the Nixon White House to its institutionalization during 
the Reagan administration and OIRA’s continued operation during four 
subsequent administrations—presents compelling evidence that OIRA 
operates as a one-way ratchet toward weaker rules.304 This identity is con-
firmed by the obvious trust that industry representatives exhibit in OIRA’s 
capacity to protect their interests.305 
It would be a remarkable set of circumstances indeed if such a powerful 
office developed a deregulatory reputation, its leadership and alumni felt 
they were being unfairly accused, and everyone neglected to correct the 
public record. One former OIRA Administrator has undertaken this chal-
lenge, doing his best to portray OIRA’s role as neutral and arguing that at 
times, it weakens rules, but at other times, it supports stronger regulation. 
In an article entitled Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Econom-
ics, John Graham cites three instances of what he describes as “lifesaving 
regulation” that OIRA “advocated” between 2001–06 while he served as its 
Administrator.306 These examples do not stand up to scrutiny and, in any 
event, represent an exceedingly small universe of OIRA’s interventions. 
The first is the reduction of diesel exhaust.307 OIRA under Graham  
solicited comments from industry and conservative groups on which  
regulations that had emerged from the Clinton administration should be  
re-evaluated by President George W. Bush.308 The Mercatus Center, a right-
wing think tank headquartered at George Mason University, complained 
about EPA’s fairly strong rule requiring reductions from diesel engines used 
on-road in, for example, long-haul trucks. But OIRA disagreed, concluding 
that, because the benefits exceeded the costs by a ratio of sixteen to one, it 
would support EPA.309 This enthusiasm for diesel engine reductions,  
Graham explains, extended to a joint EPA/OIRA effort to draft new rules 
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on emissions reductions in off-road vehicles used in agriculture, construction, 
and mining.310 Quite apart from the strangeness of the claim that it was a 
victory for the environment and public to have EPA partnering with OIRA 
on a rule that EPA had full authority to undertake on its own, Graham fails 
to report that the rule was delayed when OIRA forced EPA to undertake 
an elaborate cost-benefit analysis to justify it.311 
Graham’s second example involves OIRA’s role in helping to craft the 
George W. Bush administration’s “Clear Skies” proposal outlining legisla-
tion to amend the Clean Air Act.312 Left out of his analysis is the political 
reality that the Clear Skies proposal was widely viewed as weakening the 
Clean Air Act’s existing requirements and was dismissed by Democratic 
congressional leaders and environmentalists.313 When it became obvious 
that Clear Skies was off the congressional agenda, EPA was compelled to 
fulfill its existing statutory mandate by crafting a new rule to diminish 
sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions from power plants; Graham counts 
OIRA’s “clearing” of this rule as proof that it sometimes supports affirmative 
regulation.314 Acquiescing to an expert agency’s interpretation of a statutory 
mandate should be routine at OIRA. Claiming it as a notable, positive 
event actually confirms the suspicion that OIRA’s usual practice is to view 
any EPA rule, regardless of statutory origin, with suspicion. 
Graham’s final example concerns vehicle fuel efficiency standards. A 
loophole in the original standards exempting “light trucks” from  
fuel-efficiency requirements was the genesis of the sports utility vehicle: 
manufacturers simply took light truck beds and lowered passenger compart-
ments onto them without redesigning the vehicle as a whole.315 The result 
was a vehicle that was exempt from fuel-efficiency standards, with a rela-
tively narrow and elevated wheel base and a top-heavy passenger space that 
caused it to be susceptible to rollovers. Tired of waiting for federal regula-
tors to plug the light truck loophole, the State of California announced that 
it would take advantage of its authority under the Clean Air Act to issue a 
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more stringent fuel-efficiency standard than what the federal government 
required.316 Graham’s efforts to help other Bush administration officials to 
out-maneuver this threat are the gist of his claim that OIRA was  
pro-regulation in this context. He does not mention that, had California 
succeeded, other states would soon have followed suit, and manufacturers 
would have been compelled to sell more fuel-efficient vehicles nationwide.317 
Beyond Graham’s anecdotal evidence, surprisingly few empirical studies 
of the effect of OIRA’s review on the substance of individual rules are 
available. The best is one by Professor David Driesen, who undertook a 
comprehensive review of the scholarly literature and other studies and 
reports documenting the impact of OIRA’s review, concluding that the 
process routinely slowed and reduced the stringency of environmental, 
safety, and health regulation.318 In the empirical portion of his research, 
Driesen examined twenty-five rules identified by a GAO study as signifi-
cantly affected by OIRA’s review in 2001–02,319 finding that OIRA’s 
recommended changes reduced regulatory protections with respect to twenty-
four of the rules, while the one remaining change was neutral.320 
Professors Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh interviewed thirty-
five top EPA presidential (i.e., Senate-confirmed) appointees: fourteen from 
the George H.W. Bush administration and twenty-one from the Clinton 
administration.321 Their analysis, based on a lengthy survey composed of 107 
questions and administered by the authors in person or over the telephone, 
focused on the nature of White House staff participation in regulatory 
review.322 What is especially noteworthy about this survey is that because it 
involved the perceptions of political appointees—not career civil servants—
respondents were significantly more likely to be sympathetic to the presi-
dent’s efforts to control the bureaucracy. On the basis of the survey results, 
Bressman and Vandenbergh concluded that OIRA’s review “regularly skews 
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rulemaking in a deregulatory direction” and that OIRA uses “cost-benefit 
analysis to impose its own normative preference for deregulation.”323  
Bressman and Vandenbergh warn that the haphazard and non-
transparent consultations between agency staff and White House officials 
could undermine the more orderly process followed by the agencies in 
adopting a rule, including putting proposals out for public comment, 
analyzing the comments, and modifying the rules accordingly: 
It is not a sufficient response to say that the president gets involved 
in agency decision-making when he wants the public to understand 
that he is responsible for particular agency policies or rules. Even if 
such behavior promotes accountability on a limited basis, the con-
cern is that it may not promote rationality in a systematic way, as 
a model of agency decision-making should.324 
A third study, conducted by Professor Steven Croley, involved an examina-
tion of paper records regarding meetings held by OIRA between 1993 and 
2000.325 Croley characterized the nature of the outside interest groups that 
met with OIRA staff, but his categories were so expansive that the figures 
he developed are not very useful. For example, he described all “business 
firms” and “trade associations” as “narrow” interests and all public interest 
groups as “broad-based” interests.326 But if OIRA had several meetings 
with both types of groups regarding a rule, even if the number of meetings 
with industry groups far exceeded the meetings with public interest groups, 
the meetings were coded as a single instance of so-called “pluralistic” meet-
ings.327 Accordingly, Croley would categorize the forty-seven meetings that 
OIRA held on the coal ash rule, the overwhelming majority of which  
involved industry representatives, as a single pluralistic meeting.328  
Croley then compared the number of rules subject to change by OIRA 
with the number of meetings held with the different types of groups, con-
cluding that “the White House changed a disproportionately high number 
of rules that were the subject of meetings only with broad-based groups, 
though not to a statistically significant extent.”329 He interpreted this  
observation as a “finding at odds with any simple picture of White House 
review according to which the White House delivers regulatory favors  
to economically powerful interest groups while ignoring broad-based  
                                                                                                                      
 323. Id. at 50. 
 324. Id. at 70. 
 325. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investiga-
tion, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003). 
 326. Id. at 853. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Meeting Records, supra note 272. 
 329. Croley, supra note 325, at 860. 
  
272 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
interests.”330 In fact, his questionable methodology undermines any such 
conclusion or, for that matter, any definitive judgment about the substance 
of OIRA’s interventions in rulemaking over time.  
Without seeing the paperwork that agencies like EPA send over to 
OIRA (“before” documents), and then reviewing the text of the rules and 
rule proposals that are produced as a result of OIRA’s review (“after” doc-
uments), it is difficult to determine with specificity what changes OIRA is 
responsible for making. In direct violation of the clear instructions con-
tained in section 6(b)(4) of Executive Order 12,866, OIRA does not make 
“before” and “after” documents available to the public.331 They only become 
available if the agency responsible for the rule posts the documents on its 
website, as EPA did with respect to coal ash.332 Nevertheless, as Professor 
Croley’s study illustrates, rates of change in rules and rule proposals that 
were subject to a significant number of meetings with industry representa-
tives is a rough proxy for the influence of demands that rules be 
weakened.333 CPR used this proxy in its more fine-grained analysis of 
OIRA’s interventions, reaching the same conclusion.334  
For all of these reasons, any close observer of OIRA’s behavior over 
time would be hard pressed to assert that it ever takes a consistently neutral 
approach to the policy choices presented by rulemaking in the arena of 
health, worker safety, and environmental protection, even under chief exec-
utives with a more moderate approach to these issues, such as Presidents 
Clinton and Obama. Instead, the sheer weight of its history, culture, and 
professional composition maintain its instinctive hostility toward such 
protective requirements.  
As troubling as OIRA’s historical track record with respect to indi-
vidual rules may be from a public interest perspective, it is relatively old 
news. OIRA’s fans justify the phenomenon as a necessary counterweight to 
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unbridled agency advocacy.335 I have argued here that OIRA’s operation as a 
one-way ratchet is unacceptable, not least because its activities undermine 
the clear intent of ambitious, protective statutes in a process that is hidden 
from the public view. A far preferable way for conservatives to accomplish 
such changes in a democratic, federalist republic would be to garner the 
votes to amend these laws. If they cannot, or if Congress is too dysfunc-
tional and polarized to make such lawmaking practical, the least OIRA can 
do is to be transparent and tread carefully with respect to statutory man-
dates. Otherwise, as Professor Nina Mendelson points out, the political 
reasons for certain choices are made less—not more—transparent by 
OIRA’s interventions.336  
Regardless of how this long-running dialogue plays out in the future, 
my case for terminating centralized review does not rest solely, or even 
primarily, on these grounds. If the agencies were up and running, unfet-
tered by political interference and possessing adequate funding to pursue 
their statutory mandates effectively, the balancing argument might be more 
convincing. But that relatively healthy state of affairs is a distant memory. 
Given the widening incidence of agency dysfunction and regulatory failure, 
the more important and unrecognized implication of regulatory review is 
the significant lost opportunity costs that OIRA imposes on the American 
public. 
B. Lost Opportunity Costs 
Lost opportunity costs are the direct product of OIRA’s myopic role as 
the White House’s window on the regulatory world. By squarely occupying 
the space within the Executive Branch that is concerned with regulatory 
policy, OIRA forestalls other players from taking the initiative and acting 
to remedy agency dysfunction. In effect, the White House drives blind 
with respect to the acute funding shortfalls that threaten the viability of the 
protector agencies. The President’s centralized domestic policy-making 
staff has never acknowledged that health, safety, and environmental agen-
cies need stronger legal authority, especially with respect to enforcement, to 
accomplish their missions. When crises like the Deepwater Horizon spill 
erupt, the White House staff and the President are forced to react. But 
those reactions do not appear to be informed by any comprehensive analysis 
of why the agencies fail to prevent such catastrophes and, as important, 
what reforms are needed to ensure that these disasters do not occur again. 
OIRA’s single-minded focus on individual regulations, and its fierce  
assertion of the power to oversee the entire regulatory system, also means 
                                                                                                                      
 335. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14; Hahn & Litan, supra note 14. 
 336. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010). 
  
274 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 1:1 
that the White House has failed to respond to a series of cross-cutting 
problems that affect several agencies and can only be addressed through 
affirmative policy-making at the highest levels. So, for example, consistent 
with its institutional bias, OIRA is preoccupied with ensuring that federal 
agencies and departments opposed to a regulatory proposal have ample 
opportunity to condemn it behind closed doors, drafting “inter-agency 
comments” that are withheld from the public.337 Recently, it convened an 
inter-agency group to establish a uniform economic estimate of the social 
costs of carbon emissions for the purposes of cost-benefit analyses of rules 
that have a potential impact on climate change.338 But its recorded history 
contains no indication that it has ever convened agencies to develop  
an affirmative proposal that would address industrial practices that harm 
public health, worker safety, or the environment and that fall within the 
jurisdiction of more than one agency. 
The best contemporary example of a neglected, cross-cutting problem 
is the growing threat posed by imported consumer products. America and 
other developed countries have largely exported their manufacturing foot-
prints abroad, especially to China and other developing countries in 
Southeast Asia. The value of Chinese imports in the U.S. marketplace is 
estimated to be approximately $246 billion, about forty percent of the value 
of total imports. Yet China’s behemoth economy lacks effective regulatory 
controls at the national level, and the complex supply chains that go into 
producing a final product create ample economic incentives for adulteration 
or the use of tainted ingredients.339 U.S. regulators are overmatched by 
the scope and size of the problem, and an effective, cross-cutting solution 
to these circumstances is not even a glimmer on the horizon.340 
One of the most prominent episodes of food adulteration involved 
melamine, an industrial chemical used in the manufacture of plastic that 
causes kidney failure. In 2008, Chinese “milk merchants” added the chemi-
cal to raw milk they received from farmers in order to boost the apparent 
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protein content of milk products.341 A small amount of the tainted milk 
made it into infant formula and candy sold in America.342 The incident 
prompted reforms of the Chinese Food and Drug Administration, but, as 
Professor Richard Suttmeier, an expert on that country’s product safety 
problems, observed to the Christian Science Monitor, some 500,000 food 
producing and processing companies exist in China, making it extraordinarily 
difficult for the Chinese government—much less the U.S. government—to 
regulate them effectively.343 
Another example involves over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate—a chemical 
with lethal side effects—that was used to mimic the more expensive  
heparin which is used as a blood thinner for kidney dialysis patients.344 
After American patients exhibited acute, sometimes fatal, allergic reactions, 
the FDA traced the problem back to its source: two Chinese companies 
that shipped contaminated heparin to the United States between 2007 and 
2008, escaping discovery by their American business partners.345 Some 
eighty percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used by American 
drug manufacturers are imported.346 Congress complained bitterly about 
the FDA’s handling of the heparin incident, especially the limited inspections 
that the agency was able to conduct at foreign manufacturing facilities.347 
According to a 2009 GAO report placing FDA oversight of drug imports 
among a small group of “high risk”—or failing—programs government-
wide, the agency does not have a firm grip on how many foreign firms 
actually produce drugs or drug ingredients for the U.S. market and inspects 
the firms it has identified at a rate of only eight percent annually.348  
On July 18, 2007, President George W. Bush issued an executive order 
convening an inter-agency taskforce to study the import problem.349 But 
the taskforce spent barely three months on this complex problem, issuing a 
report in November 2007 that recommended a series of reforms, many of 
which either required legislative action or the creation of new, unfunded 
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administrative programs that were never pursued by either the Bush or 
Obama administrations.350 As an indication of the lack of seriousness of 
this effort, the cover letter from Michael Leavitt, then Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, said that in the three months 
between the executive order and the report’s issuance, “the State Depart-
ment has led a vigorous international outreach effort to communicate our 
import safety priorities with our trade partners around the world.”351 In 
such a short period of time, consultation could not have occurred on more 
than a cursory level with a small handful of countries. 
Ensuring the safety of food, drug, and consumer products imported 
from developing countries with weak central governments and no effective 
regulatory infrastructure is an extraordinarily challenging problem. Twelve 
American agencies share jurisdiction over food safety with sometimes over-
lapping authority.352 The United States cannot inspect its way out of this 
problem. It may not even be able to enforce its way out of the problem, 
although stringent criminal penalties for importers of tainted or unsafe prod-
ucts would be one way to motivate the creation of a third-party inspection 
system.353 Nevertheless, no matter how compelling the need for regulation, 
other countries could challenge such solutions as unwarranted barriers to 
trade.354 
Because so many domestic agencies, private sector stakeholders, the 
Department of State, and the U.S. Trade Representative have interest in 
and expertise to offer in addressing the import problem and are unlikely to 
convene—much less manage to agree on viable solutions—on their own, the 
White House must take the lead in making import safety a priority and 
hammering out a workable system of short- and long-term solutions. 
OIRA’s small staff of economists, trained in the intricacies of cost-benefit 
analysis, steeped in the negative culture that pervades centralized review, 
and accustomed to mustering agencies to attack proposals rather than solve 
problems, is ill-equipped to undertake such a complex and challenging 
initiative. But because OIRA exists, and has the regulatory system as its 
portfolio, no other White House office has stepped into this growing 
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breach. Further delays in coping with unsafe imports can fairly be laid at 
OIRA’s doorstep. 
C. If Not OIRA, What? 
We come at last to the question of what should replace OIRA’s brand 
of centralized review. The scope of this Article would be exceeded by a 
detailed explication of how a new framework should be implemented and, 
in any event, such details should probably be left to people familiar with 
the inner workings of the White House staff. But the overarching goals of 
this recommendation are quite straightforward: White House staff should 
stop reviewing individual rules and rule proposals on a routine basis, instead 
delegating this responsibility to the political appointees who lead the agen-
cies and are already accountable for making wise and balanced decisions. 
On the other hand, some group of the White House staff should assume 
responsibility for dealing with cross-cutting issues; depending on the depth 
and persistence of the problem, these assignments should be made on either 
a permanent or an ad hoc basis. 
This proposal stops short of urging the abolition of OIRA. Only 
Congress could get rid of OIRA because it was created by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act,355 which assigns a series of discrete tasks having to do with 
the review of proposals by agencies or departments to require the completion 
of additional paperwork by citizens, state and local government, or private 
sector entities.356 
Placing the senior agency political appointees in the driver’s seat makes 
sense for several reasons. For all practical purposes, agency heads are the 
public face of an administration with respect to the highest profile regulato-
ry issues, including environmental protection, food, drug, and product 
safety, and preventing life-threatening hazards in the workplace. These 
appointees are both confirmed by the Senate and subject to oversight by 
both Houses of Congress. Without exception, they are substantive experts 
in the missions their agencies and departments are assigned to undertake, 
allowing them to consider the full range of policy concerns raised by a given 
regulatory proposal. They are far sturdier surrogates than anonymous 
White House staff working in an office “that most people have never heard 
of.”357  
One objection to this line of reasoning is that agency leaders become 
captured by the ideologues who dominate their career staffs and lose track 
                                                                                                                      
 355. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2006). 
 356. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006). 
 357. Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 994 (2011) (quoting Martha 
Minow, Dean of the Harvard Law School, in her introduction of Sunstein when he spoke at 
the school on March 1, 2010).  
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of the larger issues a President must consider, including the health of the 
economy. The fear of bureaucrats-run-amok hypothesizes that the civil 
service can be captured by the left as well as the right. Leaving an agency 
on its own will result in skewed policy outcomes, with more protections and 
regulations than the country can reasonably afford or that its citizens truly 
want. But this concern is theoretical and is not based in history or reality. 
Its proponents would be hard pressed to think of a time period when this 
phenomenon actually happened. EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus’ 
insistence on regulating lead in gasoline is one potential example of  
so-called capture by the left: he came under heavy fire from the oil and auto 
industries as well as White House officials sympathetic to their objections.358 
But the Nixon White House remained ready, able, and willing to hold 
Ruckelshaus as politically accountable as it dared given the popularity of 
environmental measures at that historical moment. No one would argue 
today that removing lead from gas was the wrong decision.359 Instead, it is 
viewed as an unequivocal success for the agency. 
Some commentators argue that without OIRA, cost-benefit analysis 
will recede and regulatory agencies will be free to make decisions for a host 
of flakey, ill-advised reasons, including the most extreme forms of moral or 
aesthetic preferences.360 This set of assertions ignores the fact that OIRA 
has never drafted the regulatory impact analyses required for all rulemaking 
proposals in the first instance. Rather, this task is accomplished by econo-
mists who are firmly ensconced at each of the protector agencies discussed 
herein. The system would not fall apart were OIRA unavailable to oversee 
it. I am no fan of cost-benefit analysis, and a robust literature explains its 
faults.361 However, the methodology is firmly ensconced as an essential 
element of the regulatory system. So long as the President orders agencies 
                                                                                                                      
 358. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN, POISONED FOR PENNIES: THE ECONOMICS OF 
TOXICS AND PRECAUTION 38–39 (2008) (“William Ruckelshaus[] had declared that leaded 
gasoline endangered the public health and welfare and impaired the performance of catalytic 
converters . . . .”). 
 359. See id. at 34 (“Such notable regulatory scholars as John Graham, Robert Hahn, 
Richard Stewart, Cass Sunstein, and Jonathan Wiener have pointed to the influence of cost-
benefit analysis on the 1980s-era lead phase-down as evidence of the evenhandedness of this 
analytical framework. However, that cost-benefit analysis appeared only in the last act of a 
long drama.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 360. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 14. 
 361. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 18 (raising the ethical and 
practical problems with this methodology); Driesen, supra note 318 (demonstrating empiri-
cally that cost-benefit analysis is one of the factors that weakens the protectiveness of 
pending rules); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, 
and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997 (2002) (concluding that cost estimates 
are provided by regulated industries and are generally not based on empirical analysis); 
Parker, supra note 18 (rebutting arguments made by proponents of the methodology). 
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to continue using it, the absence of OIRA should not make a significant 
difference to the nuts and bolts of its implementation.  
Removing OIRA as supervisor-in-chief will not stop industry lobbyists 
from visiting the White House to get help in their efforts to persuade 
agency heads to back down from a position, and anticipation of such visits 
inevitably motivates the political appointee who occupies the office to 
ensure that she can defend that position. Agencies would still undertake the 
analyses required by statutes such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act,362 the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,363 and the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act.364 And they would still be subject to congressional 
oversight and judicial review—arguably far more potent influences on their 
possible excesses than OIRA. All of these mechanisms exert substantial 
pressure on the agencies and help to explain why they can sometimes 
appear paralyzed by indecision. 
There remains the question of how to undertake the difficult and com-
plex work of finding lasting policy solutions to cross-cutting regulatory 
problems, a function OIRA does not recognize as legitimate and that is a 
major reason for removing it from any role in the arena of regulatory policy 
making. The problem has several dimensions: (1) review and coordination 
of the annual government-wide regulatory agenda; (2) consideration of 
funding issues that affect the agencies; (3) determination of whether and 
how the President should support amendments to strengthen the agencies’ 
outmoded legal authorities; and (4) development of solutions to cross-
cutting issues that affect more than one agency. 
The White House staff has expanded in size over the last two decades 
to a number in the ballpark of 1,800 to 2,000 people.365 These resources are 
adequate to support White House coordination of the annual regulatory 
agenda, as well as to focus on specific rules that will have a significant 
impact on the economy. So, for example, a President could decide that 
energy policy was a top priority for his Administration and ask all relevant 
agency heads to assemble lists of rules, guidance documents, purchasing 
policies,366 and other decisions that might affect the actual, environmental, 
                                                                                                                      
 362. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2006). 
 363. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-21, 
110 Stat. 857 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 28 U.S.C.). 
 364. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71 (2006). 
 365. Farina, supra note 15, at 405.  
 366. See, e.g., Jessica Leber, Riding a Wave of Culture Change, DOD Strives to Trim 
Energy Demand, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/07/20/ 
20climatewire-riding-a-wave-of-culture-change-dod-strives-23689.html (“[T]he U.S. military, 
the nation’s single largest energy consumer—at more than 1 percent of the U.S. total—has 
come [far] in recognizing and reducing its reliance on fossil fuels. But experts say . . . the 
military still has [far] to go . . . . Experts say making strides will require changing the culture 
of an institution . . . . Several policies already are under way [including a] presidential 
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and public health costs and benefits of various fuels, as well as proposals 
with indirect effects on the energy marketplace, such as government-wide 
greenhouse gas reduction policies.367 White House staff could work with 
agency heads to calibrate when and how these proposals would be released, 
in the process developing a narrative about why the President supports 
them.  
Funding shortfalls increasingly undermine the agencies’ effectiveness, 
and the steady decline in their resources measured in constant dollars368 
makes the alternative of supporting their permitting and licensing activities 
through specific, dedicated industry fees ever more appealing. For example, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission receives ninety percent of its funding 
from licensing fees imposed on nuclear power plants.369 A second example 
is Title V of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which shifts the costs of 
reviewing power plant permits to their private owners and operators.370 In 
some states, regulators are allowed to apply the civil penalties they collect 
toward their daily operations, and this approach is worth exploring at the 
federal level.371 Exploration of these alternatives is a task well-suited for a 
working group of agency and outside experts convened by the White House 
staff. 
Updating the legal authorities available to health and safety agencies to 
pursue emerging problems is a low priority for Congress unless a well-
publicized crisis somehow breaks through this legislative inertia. The 
President and his White House staff are in the position to ask agency heads 
to develop priorities for such amendments, and a centralized taskforce 
might even discover that some of these problems can be dealt with in a 
piece of legislation that affects multiple agencies at once. So, for example, 
the anomaly of awarding more severe punishment for harassing a burro in a 
national park than for grossly negligent conduct that results in the death  
of a worker372 could be juxtaposed in such a legislative initiative, with the 
President arguing that loss of life or injuries to people that are the foresee-
able result of regulatory violations should incur stringent, uniform 
penalties. 
                                                                                                                      
order . . . requir[ing] federal departments to cut energy and water demand and use more 
renewable energy every year.”).  
 367. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. 248 (2010) (making “reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions a priority for Federal agencies”). 
 368. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 106. 
 369. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2010: PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 15 (2010), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr1542/v16/sr1542v16.pdf. 
 370. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b) (2006).  
 371. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 08.19.04.09(B) (1992). 
 372. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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Many cross-cutting problems could be addressed by administrative 
action within the discretion of the President. For example, rationalizing 
and making more consistent government enforcement policies could benefit 
from consideration by a White House taskforce. Any enforcement action 
that does not recoup—at the very least—the avoided costs of complying 
with the law that was broken has limited deterrent effect. Recovering that 
amount should be the baseline for any consent decree or complaint, with 
punitive assessments of civil penalties to discourage others from commit-
ting similar violations added on top of such cost recoupment. EPA has 
developed a sophisticated model for calculating avoided costs,373 but as the 
BP situation indicates, other agencies have much to learn from its relatively 
robust approach.374 And when noncompliance causes fatal accidents, criminal 
prosecutions should be expected. It is a cross-cutting policy change worthy 
of attention from both the agencies and the Department of Justice. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the arguments against centralized review made here are further 
supported by the fact that Presidents are under no obligation to continue 
the OIRA process. If OIRA’s identity as a powerful deregulatory force is as 
obvious as I claim, its continuation must constitute not just a presidential 
preference, but a preference that is well-supported by the President’s con-
stitutional role. And if a strong, anti-regulatory OIRA is what presidents 
think they want, why shouldn’t they have it? 
This argument is particularly salient in the context of the Obama  
administration because Cass Sunstein is the best educated, most prolific 
intellectual ever to serve as OIRA Administrator,375 as well as an early 
supporter of the President who appears to enjoy his full confidence.376 
Sunstein could have broken with OIRA’s long-standing institutional identi-
ty, instead envisioning his role as the architect of fundamental reforms that 
would make the broken regulatory system work. A group of academic col-
leagues, including the author, urged him to consider this alternative soon 
after he took office: 
                                                                                                                      
 373. Enforcement Economic Models, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/econmodels/ 
index.html#ben (last updated Nov. 19, 2009).  
 374. See supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.7. 
 375. A profile in NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE described him as “certainly the most 
productive and probably the most influential liberal legal scholar of his generation . . . .” 
Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein Wants to Nudge Us, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 16, 2010, 
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The U.S. regulatory system—over which OIRA has a uniquely far-
reaching influence—is at a critical juncture. Following years of 
neglect and, more recently, outright hostility from the George W. 
Bush administration, the system is in disrepair . . . . To repair the 
badly broken regulatory system, the next OIRA Administrator will 
need to re-imagine OIRA’s role to ensure that this little known 
but powerful office is part of the solution, rather than part of the 
problem.377 
Sunstein not only ignored this opportunity, but continued business as usual 
at OIRA.  
When the 2010 midterm election turned against President Obama for 
reasons having nothing to do with health, safety, or environmental regula-
tions, Sunstein helped to turn the administration further toward a narrative 
that is consistent with OIRA’s institutional identity: regulation has a direct 
bearing on the economy, and in times of economic stress the nation cannot 
afford it. We can assume that the President participated in the decision to 
make this change, just as he put Sunstein in office knowing what the 
appointment would mean. 
Because most discussions of unitary executive theory focus on the theo-
retical scope of presidential authority, as opposed to the policy 
ramifications of the decisions the President makes in any given context, 
believers in the doctrine begin and end there.378 The President should have 
whatever he wants, certainly with respect to managing the Executive 
Branch. In contrast, the validity of the arguments I have made here  
depends not on whether the President has the authority to continue OIRA, 
but rather on whether it is a good idea for him to do so. Under-regulation is 
a much more serious problem than over-regulation. Centralized White 
House review should be abolished because that outcome would be best for 
the American public. 
                                                                                                                      
 377. Signatories of this document, entitled Reinvigorating Protection of Health, Safety, 
and the Environment: The Choices Facing Cass Sunstein, include Professors John S. Applegate, 
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The nation has embraced health, safety, and environmental regulation 
as an affirmative and important role for government. Despite this broad 
support for regulatory schemes, deregulatory forces have managed to hobble 
the regulatory state through funding shortfalls, political interference, and 
neglect of the crucial job of updating the agencies’ statutory mandates. All 
of these efforts have been largely invisible to the voting public. But by the 
end of the George W. Bush administration, which pursued these techniques 
with a vengeance, regulatory agencies were on life support.  
The worldwide recession that was in its infancy when President Obama 
took office had the effect of shoving the implications of this unacceptable 
state of affairs to the back burner. Even the nation’s fixation on live video 
feed of the billowing plume of oil at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico was 
not enough to elevate these issues.  
Pragmatists might suggest that President Obama was prudent to  
respond to a shift in the balance of power in Washington, D.C. But the 
President and his staff have ignored the probability that in the absence of 
real reform, life-threatening episodes are likely to recur, causing irrevocable 
damage and, not incidentally, further tarnishing the administration’s legacy. 
Aggressive rulemaking and enforcement are essential antidotes to a chaotic 
global economic environment that creates irresistible incentives for compa-
nies to cut corners. 
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that OIRA continues to serve 
as the bottleneck for protective regulation, as its founders designed it and 
as its critics have long alleged it to be. It has systematically ignored the 
most important problems that affect the administrative state, including 
regulatory failure and agency dysfunction. OIRA is tiny, and most staff 
members are economists with training in the details of cost-benefit analysis 
but scant experience with the other disciplines needed to inform policy 
making. All of OIRA’s Administrators have accepted its historical mission 
and suffered from a lack of insight and imagination.  
The President and the nation would be far better served if he aban-
doned the effort to centralize control over individual regulations within the 
White House, instead leaving the political appointees who head the rele-
vant agencies and departments as the first and last line of accountability for 
those efforts. If this or any other President truly wants to “win the future,” 
OIRA’s myopia and hostility must give way to an affirmative vision of how 
government can protect those who truly cannot protect themselves.379  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1 
THE RIA’S COMPARISON OF REGULATORY BENEFITS TO COSTS 
 Strong Option
Subtitle C
Weak Option
Subtitle D
Weakest Option 
Subtitle “D prime” 
1. Regulatory Costs: $20,349 $8,095 $3,259
2. Regulatory Benefits:
($230,817) to 
$102,191 $1,168 to $41,761 $593 to $17,501 
3. Net Benefits (2-1) ($251,166) to 
$81,842
($6,927) to 
$33,666
($2,666) to 
$14,242
4. Benefit/Cost Ratio 
(2/1) (11.343) to 5.022 0.144 to 5.159 0.182 to 5.370 
Present Values in $Millions at 7 percent Discount Rate over 50-Year Future 
Period-of-Analysis 2012 to 2061380 
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TABLE 2 
THE RIA’S COMPUTATION OF REGULATORY BENEFITS 
Benefit Category 
Strong Option
Subtitle C
Weak Option
Subtitle D
Weakest Option 
Subtitle “D prime” 
Groundwater 
Protection Benefits $970 $375 $188 
Avoided Human 
Cancer Risks 
$504 (726 cancer 
risks)
$207 (296 cancer 
risks)
$104 (148 cancer 
risks)
Avoided Groundwater 
Remediation Costs 
$466 $168 $84 
Avoided Impoundment
Spill Costs $1,762 to $16,732 $793 to $7,590 $405 to $3,795 
Impact on Beneficial 
Use 
($233,549) to 
$84,489 $0 to $33,796 $0 to $13,518 
Scenario #1: Increase $84,489 $33,796 $13,518
Scenario #2: Decrease 
(stigma) 
($233,549) $0 (no impact) $0 (no impact) 
Scenario #3: No 
impact $0 (no impact) $0 (no impact) $0 (no impact) 
Total Benefits: ($230,817) to $102,191 $1,168 to $41,761 $593 to $17,501 
Present Values in $Millions at 7 percent Discount Rate over 50-Year Future 
Period-of-Analysis 2012 to 2061381 
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